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ABSTRACT 
The growing sophistication of attacks and newly emerging cyber threats requires 
advanced cyber threat detection systems. Although there are several cyber threat detection 
tools in use, cyber threats and data breaches continue to rise. This research is intended to 
improve the cyber threat detection approach by developing a cyber threat detection 
framework using two complementary technologies, search engine and machine learning, 
combining artificial intelligence and classical technologies. 
In this design science research, several artifacts such as a custom search engine 
library, a machine learning-based engine and different algorithms have been developed to 
build a new cyber threat detection framework based on self-learning search and machine 
learning engines. Apache Lucene.Net search engine library was customized in order to 
function as a cyber threat detector, and Microsoft ML.NET was used to work with and train 
the customized search engine. 
This research proves that a custom search engine can function as a cyber threat 
detection system. Using both search and machine learning engines in the newly developed 
framework provides improved cyber threat detection capabilities such as self-learning and 
predicting attack details. When the two engines run together, the search engine is 
continuously trained by the machine learning engine and grow smarter to predict yet unknown 
threats with greater accuracy. While customizing the search engine to function as a cyber 
threat detector, this research also identified and proved the best algorithms for the search 
engine based cyber threat detection model. For example, the best scoring algorithm was found 
to be the Manhattan distance. The validation case study also shows that not every network 
traffic feature makes an equal contribution to determine the status of the traffic, and thus the 
variable-dimension Vector Space Model (VSM) achieves better detection accuracy than n-
dimensional VSM.  
Although the use of different technologies and approaches improved detection results, 
this research is primarily focused on developing techniques rather than building a complete 
threat detection system. Additional components such as those that can track and investigate 
the impact of network traffic on the destination devices make the newly developed framework 
robust enough to build a comprehensive cyber threat detection appliance. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
This dissertation examines existing cyber threat detection approaches and introduces a 
new approach to cyber threat detection framework development using hybrid technologies 
such as search engines and machine learning. Although the primary purpose of search engines 
is for text mining, this research shows that they can serve as cyber threat detection 
frameworks as well.  
When people and organizations connect to the Internet, there is a corresponding 
growth in risk as they increase their exposure to cyber threats. New threats are emerging, and 
the number of previously unseen malware and attack techniques is growing (Statista, 2019). 
Threat detection systems provide the frontline defense against cyber attacks. Using machine 
learning-based threat detection techniques enhances accuracy by detecting previously unseen 
attacks (Lin et al., 2018). Furthermore, using hybrid detection techniques increases the 
accuracy of detection (Samrin & Vasumathi, 2017).  
Currently no cyber threat detection system combines search engine and machine 
learning techniques. This research focuses on the design and development of a hybrid cyber 
threat detection framework using a customized search engine model that functions as a cyber 
threat detection engine and a machine learning model. Search engines process a huge amount 
of data related to search queries every day. Search engines often generate results that match 
the search query, and the results are generally ranked based on relevancy to the search query. 
According to Yahoo research (Yin et al., 2016), ranking relevance is the most critical problem 
in search engines; search problems can be treated as filtering relevant search results from less 
relevant ones. Using machine learning classification algorithms such as decision trees on 
search engines can filter out bad search results and increases relevance (Yin et al., 2016). This 
research investigates the capabilities of a search engine used as a cyber threat detection 
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system. The purpose of threat detection systems is to filter out threat activities from normal 
activities or to detect anomalies from regular activities. Anomaly-based threat detection 
systems use machine learning classification algorithms to classify threats and normal events. 
In addition to the custom search engine, the newly developed framework uses a machine 
learning-based cyber threat detection model to work together with the search engine. The 
main purpose of the machine learning model is to reinforce and continuously train the search 
engine. 
The new framework analyzes network traffic behaviors to detect cyber threats. The 
framework is intended to be used by security analysts and security tool developers. Design 
science research methodology was used to design, develop, and evaluate the proposed 
framework. Each component of the framework has been developed using superior cutting-
edge technologies such as .NET Core to target multiple platforms, multithreading for robust 
performance, the machine learning framework used in security tools, and WebSocket for real-
time communication for alerting service. Mathematical analysis has been performed to design 
efficient algorithms when necessary. A case study has been employed to evaluate the 
framework and compare the customized search engine model with the machine learning 
model. 
1.2 Design Research Problems 
As a solution-oriented technical research project, this research designs artifacts that 
improve existing threat detection approaches and conducts experiments to answer empirical 
questions about the efficiency, accuracy, and performance of the designed artifacts. The 
following are a list of Knowledge Problems (KP) and Design Problems (DP) that are 
investigated and answered in the research: 
A. KP: How do the signature-based and anomaly-based detections systems function? 
• What specific techniques are used? 
B. KP: What are the advantages and disadvantages of signature-based and anomaly-based 
detection techniques? 
C. DP: How can the threat detection framework be designed using search engine and 
machine learning techniques? 
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• KP: What are the benefits of using a search engine for a threat detection 
framework? 
D. DP: Which system requirements and specifications need to be included in the 
proposed framework? 
E. DP: Which design makes for the best cyber threat detection framework using search 
engine and machine learning? 
• What is the training data selection strategy? 
F. KP: Are there standard evaluation criteria for intrusion detection techniques? 
• DP: What comparison criteria can be designed if they are not already 
available? 
G. KP: How should the evaluation dataset be chosen? 
• DP: What is the evaluation data selection strategy? 
H. KP: What is the performance of the proposed threat detection technique and the 
framework as a solution? 
• How fast are the algorithms? 
• How efficient are the components at handling large datasets?  
• How accurate is the detection system? 
• How broad is the training data coverage? 
1.3 Design Theories and Hypotheses 
A design science project uses prior knowledge, which includes design specifications, 
useful facts, and practical knowledge, to produce additional knowledge, called posterior 
knowledge (Wieringa, 2014). A design theory contains generalizations (treatment) about the 
effects of the interaction between an artifact and its context. The design theory describes the 
effect of an artifact in the context. Artifacts include devices, software, techniques, notations, 
and so on that are designed for the purpose of contributing to stakeholder goals (Wieringa, 
Daneva, & Condori-Fernandez, 2011). In this research, the primary artifacts include two 
engines—a custom search engine and a machine learning model—as well as algorithms and 
techniques such as indexing, searching, training, prediction, and binary classification within 
the context of cyber threat detection. The developed cyber threat detection framework is 
4 
 
intended to be used primarily by security analysts and security tool developers (stakeholders).  
Wieringa’s (2014) effect generalization states that “(an artifact designed like this) interacting 
with (a context satisfying these assumptions) produces (effects like these)” (p. 96).  This can 
be expressed as (specifications of artifact) X (assumption about context) → effects. The effect 
is a generalization over a class of similar artifacts and a class of similar contexts. The 
following design theories using effect generalization provide the basis for this research and 
are thoroughly investigated within it. These serve as warrants and arguments used to prove the 
main research hypothesis, which is that the use of a search engine as a cyber threat detection 
system with machine learning techniques provides an improved cyber threat detection 
approach:  
1. Search engines use similarity measures between indexed documents in a Vector Space 
Model (VSM) to search for matching documents for a given query (Turney & Pantel, 
2010).  
2. A search engine can be tuned up to efficiently process data within a specific context 
(for example, Google image search, Google Scholar). Therefore, a search engine can 
be customized to process network traffic data in cyber threat detection contexts. 
3. As a search engine is primarily used for text data mining, machine learning can be 
applied to it for the best result (Chauhan et al., 2015). Therefore, machine learning can 
also be applied to the custom search engine specially designed to process network 
traffic data. 
4. Network traffic data can be mapped to a special form of dataset that uniquely specifies 
the traffic, which is called feature extraction. The extracted features set can be 
arranged in a way that makes it suitable for indexing in a search engine. Based on the 
training data, the set of features data represents a single event and can be classified as 
safe and unsafe while indexing. Each feature set can be represented as a vector within 
the search engine VSM. 
5. The search engine has a searcher component that can retrieve the best matches for a 
given query from the index based on configured similarity algorithms. Input traffic 
data can be a query for the searcher to return the top matching results. Similarity 
measures can be used to compare the similarity between documents. When VSM is 
used for classification, the nearest-neighbor algorithm can use similarity measures 
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(Turney & Pantel, 2010). Therefore, the matching results likely determine the type of 
the input traffic—that is, whether it is safe or a threat. 
6. The search engine can be reinforced by machine learning techniques to increase its 
accuracy (Mitra et al., 2017; Yin et al., 2016) and to expand its capability to detect yet 
unknown malicious traffic.  
1.4 Research Goals and Scope 
The purpose of this research project is to design and develop a network traffic analysis 
framework for cyber threat detection primarily using search engine and machine learning 
techniques. The popular opensource Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), Snort, Suricata, and 
Bro (Hu et al., 2017; Thongkanchorn et al., 2013), as well as machine learning-based 
detection techniques, are investigated to identify the basic design specifications for the 
proposed framework. This research is intended to improve cyber threat detection approaches 
by using hybrid technologies, such as a search engine that is specifically customized to 
classify traffic data, and a machine learning model in order for security analysts to analyze 
network traffic activities for the purpose of cyber threat detection.  
The scope of this research comprises customizing search engine components such as 
the analyzer, tokenizer, indexer, and searcher, developing a machine learning based threat 
detection engine, and evaluating and validating these components. The research is limited to 
the development of a threat detection framework that can be used in security tools or can 
grow to a standalone cyber threat detection application and does not produce a complete end-
to-end cyber threat detection appliance. 
1.5 Structure of the Research Paper 
This research paper has been divided into six chapters. As it involves the development 
of software, contents are organized to show the details of each major software engineering 
phase, such as requirement analysis, system design, system development, testing, and 
deployment. Chapters are organized as follows: 
Chapter 1. Introduction: This chapter discusses the background of the research, 
research problems, theories and hypothesis, and research goals and scope. 
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Chapter 2. Literature Review: The literature review chapter provides a comparative 
analysis of existing cyber threat detection tools, intrusion detection approaches, network 
traffic analysis tools, and detection algorithms. This chapter also discusses existing machine 
learning and search engine technologies. Finally, this chapter lays out the basic specifications 
for the new cyber threat detection framework. 
Chapter 3. System Design: This chapter incorporates research methodology as well 
as the new framework design from a software engineering perspective. Several architectural 
diagrams, algorithm designs, and use cases are discussed in this chapter. A prototype project 
analysis is included in this chapter to make design decisions on the core algorithms. 
Chapter 4. System Development: This chapter discusses implementation of the new 
framework and its components as designed in Chapter 3. This chapter involves mathematical 
analysis and the development of algorithms and components. 
Chapter 5. Case Study: This chapter discusses setting up evaluation metrics, 
evaluating of algorithms and components, optimizing techniques, and validating and 
deploying the new framework. Empirical analysis and performance results of the framework 
are discussed in this chapter. 
Chapter 6. Conclusion: This chapter concludes with the overall outcome of the 
research, its contributions and limitations, and recommendations for future development. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines the term intrusion 
as the “unauthorized act of bypassing the security mechanisms of a system” (p. 104). The 
institute defines the term “threat” as “any circumstance or event with the potential to 
adversely impact organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or 
reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation through an 
information system via unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of 
information, and/or denial of service” (Kissel, 2013, p. 202). Intrusion detection is the formal 
process of detecting intrusions, generally characterized by gathering and analyzing 
information about abnormal usage patterns and processes in order to determine if a security 
breach or violation has occurred.  
Before the development of Intrusion Detection (ID) tools, system administrators used 
to check user and device activities by sitting in front of screens. Then in the late 1970s and 
early ’80s, administrators were able to print activity logs although the manual log analysis 
was time consuming and inefficient at catching attacks in progress. In the early ’90s real-time 
intrusion detection systems that could detect attacks as they occurred emerged; in some cases, 
this allowed real-time responses to the attacks (Kemmerer & Vigna, 2002).   
The first idea of ID was published in 1980 by James P. Anderson who outlined 
computer security problems within United States Air Force operations. The first model of a 
real-time Intrusion Detection System (IDS), the Intrusion Detection Expert System (IDES), 
was developed between 1984 and 1986 by Dorothy Denning and Peter Neumann. The tool 
was a rule-based system that detected known malicious activities. Then in the 1980s and ’90s, 
research about IDS was begun and funded by the US government, and IDS tools such as 
Discovery, Haystack, Multics Intrusion Detection and Alerting System (MIDAS), and 
Network Audit Directory and Intrusion Reporter (NADIR) were developed. In 1997 the first 
commercial real-time attack detection called RealSecure was developed for Windows NT 4.0. 
But as networks expanded and got faster, carrying out network-based attack detection became 
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difficult. Therefore, to solve this problem, host-based intrusion detections such as TCP 
Wrappers, Tripwire, and Snort were introduced. Snort was introduced in 1998 for UNIX 
systems, and then was ported to Windows systems in 2000 (Bruneau, 2001). 
2.1 Intrusion Detection Systems 
Based on the scope of the detection, there are two types of IDS: Network Intrusion 
Detection Systems (NIDS) and Host-Based Intrusion Detection Systems (HIDS) (Samrin & 
Vasumathi, 2017). Based on the detection techniques, intrusion detection systems can be 
classified into two groups: signature-based detection and anomaly-based detection (Bello et 
al., 2015; García-Teodoro et al., 2009). In some research (Bello et al., 2015; Samrin & 
Vasumathi, 2017) signature-based detections are called misuse detections.  
2.1.1 Signature-Based Detection Systems 
Signature-based detection mechanisms search for predefined signatures or patterns 
within the analyzed data to determine an attack (García-Teodoro et al., 2009). There are 
several IDS in the cybersecurity industry, but the popular opensource IDS solutions are Snort, 
Suricata, and Bro (Hu et al., 2017; Thongkanchorn et al., 2013). 
 
Snort: Snort is an opensource intrusion detection and prevention system originally 
developed in 1998. Snort is capable of real-time traffic analysis and packet logging with 
minimal disruption to running operations. Snort uses rule-based pattern-matching techniques 
to detect intrusions. Snort rules specify unique characteristics of the network traffic and 
trigger an alert when conditions met. In Snort, rules are divided into two parts: the header and 
the options. The rule header contains the action, protocol, IP addresses, and port numbers of 
the rule. The rule option part contains alert messages and information on which parts of the 
packet should be inspected (Cisco, 2019). As Snort is a signature-based detection system, it 
cannot detect previously unseen attacks. Developing a Snort rule, therefore, requires a core 
understanding of how the vulnerability works. Because Snort is widely known in the industry, 
extension works have also been created to optimize it. For instance, (Gómez et al., 2009) 
extended Snort by adding a statistical anomaly-based detection feature. The training model is 
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stored in a MySQL database. The performance of this approach depends on the database 
operations and the statistical model. 
 
Suricata: Introduced in 2009, Suricata is another popular signature-based detection 
system. Like Snort, it is an opensource threat detection engine using extensive rules and 
signature language. Suricata supports standard input and output formats like YAML Ain’t 
Markup Language (YAML) and JavaScript Object Notation (JSON), and it integrates with 
external systems like Logstash, Kibana, and different databases. Suricata signatures/rules 
consist of three parts: the action that determines when the rule matches; the header that 
defines the protocol, IP addresses, and direction of rules; and the rule options that define 
specific properties of the rules. Suricata offers compatibility with Snort rules (Suricata, 2019), 
and can handle larger volumes of traffic than Snort with similar detection capability (Albin, 
2011). As Suricata is a multithreaded system, its detection capability is more accurate in 
multicore environments; however, Suricata has higher system overhead than Snort and is less 
accurate in stressed environments (Day & Burns, 2011). Suricata uses Lua scripting language, 
which provides the flexibility to create dynamic rules that would be difficult to create with 
Snort. 
 
Bro: Bro, recently renamed Zeek, is a network security monitor system used to detect 
suspicious activity, measure performance, and troubleshoot. Bro is an opensource project that 
has been in development since 1995, but the project has been widely supported since 2010.  
Unlike Snort and Suricata, Bro focuses extensively on network analysis. Bro has the 
capability to log and store network activities in high-level terms (ASCII forms) for several 
application-layer protocols, such as DNS, FTP, HTTP, IRC, SMTP, SSH, and SSL. Bro uses 
standard log file formats, which is suitable for postprocessing with external log searchers and 
databases, such as Elasticsearch. Bro supports pattern-based intrusion detection and uses an 
event-based programming model for anomaly detection. Bro is a single-threaded application 
and runs on a single core; however, it supports clustered deployment so that multiple workers 
can process the traffic streams (The Zeek Project Revision, 2019). Table 1 summarizes the 
three popular intrusion detection systems. 
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Table 1. Summary of Snort, Suricata, and Bro 
Snort Suricata Bro 
Signature-based IDS. Signature-based IDS. Comprehensive network 
logging tool and Signature-
based IDS. 
Supports multithreading and 
multicore systems. 
Supports multithreading and 
multicore systems. 
Uses single thread and 
supports single core system. 
Rule-based detection. Rule-based detection. Uses 
Lua scripting for custom 
detection. 
Rule-based detection. Uses 
Bro scripting for intrusion 
detection. 
Rules are easy to write but 
challenging to adapt to 
complex threats with high-
speed networks. 
Has flexibility to write 
dynamic rule and handles 
complex threats. 
Capable of recording 
detailed network behaviors. 
Deep-packet inspection is 
resource intensive. 
Supports Linux, FreeBSD, 
OpenBSD. 
Supports Linux, FreeBSD, 
OpenBSD, MacOS, 
Windows. 
Supports Linux, FreeBSD, 
MacOS X. 
2.1.2 Anomaly-Based Detection Systems 
Anomaly-based detections identify a suspicious event from a security perspective by 
analyzing its behavior. Anomaly-based detection techniques can be classified into three 
groups based on the nature of the behavioral model processing: statistical-based, knowledge-
based, and machine learning-based. Statistical-based detection is based on the metrics of the 
network traffic, such as traffic rate, number of packets per protocol, and number of IP 
addresses. The detection system compares the current traffic behavior with the previously 
trained statistical profile. Knowledge-based systems are expert systems intended to identify 
classes from the audit data according to a set of rules, parameters, or procedures. Machine 
learning-based techniques are based on models that enable the patterns analyzed to be 
categorized (García-Teodoro et al., 2009). 
In anomaly-based detection systems, there are two phases: the learning phase and the 
detection phase. The detection system builds a system profile in the learning phase and 
compares the current system parameters with the one stored in the learning phase; if there is a 
deviation, an alert is reported. Therefore, anomaly-based detection systems can detect yet 
unknown attacks (Al-Jarrah & Arafat, 2015). Machine learning detection techniques such as 
11 
 
Neural Networks classify different forms of network attacks (Mowla et al., 2017). Using 
intrusion detection techniques based on Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) improves the 
accuracy of detection system since they can extract enhanced behavior features (Lin et al., 
2018). Table 2 summarizes the pros and cons of signature-based and anomaly-based intrusion 
detection systems. 
Table 2. Comparison between Signature-Based and Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection 
Techniques 
Detection Technique Advantages Disadvantages 
Signature-based  Provides good detection result for 
known attacks. 
Not capable of detecting new 
attacks. 
Anomaly-based  Capable of detecting new 
intrusion events. 
Less accurate for known attacks. 
Resource intensive. 
Statistical-based: Prior 
knowledge of normal traffic 
activity is not required. 
Can be misled or easily trained by 
an attacker. 
 
Knowledge-based: Flexible and 
scalable. 
Depends on high-quality data, 
which is not easily available and 
time consuming. 
Machine learning: Flexible and 
scalable. 
Lack of descriptive model. 
Resource intensive. 
 
2.2 Machine Learning Algorithms in Intrusion Detection Systems 
2.2.1 Machine Learning 
There are several machine learning algorithms such as classification, logistic 
regression, etc. In machine learning the intrusion detection lies in the classification problem 
category. There are two machine learning techniques for data classification and clustering: 
supervised and unsupervised learning. The supervised learning method uses labeled datasets 
to learn the classification, whereas unsupervised learning finds similar groups within the 
training dataset (Kong et al., 2018). 
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2.2.2 Machine Learning Tools 
Machine learning tools vary by the algorithms and techniques they support, 
programming languages they use, ease of implementation, and prediction accuracy of trained 
models. Machine learning tools share trained models. For instance, a TensorFlow trained 
model can be used by ML.NET (Microsoft, 2019a). Some of the machine learning tools that 
support classification algorithms are listed as follows: 
Weka: Weka (Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis) is collection of data 
mining algorithms. It was first developed in C by the University of Waikato, New Zealand in 
1997, then later rewritten in Java. It is composed of several data processing and classification 
algorithms such as classification, clustering, and regression (Choudhury & Bhowal, 2015; 
Hall et al., 2009).  
TensorFlow: A machine learning tool developed by Google that focuses on deep 
neural networks, TensorFlow uses unified dataflow graphs to represent the computation in an 
algorithm, a shared state, and the operations that mutate that state. Several Google services 
use TensorFlow (Abadi et al., 2016). 
Microsoft Cognitive Toolkit (CNTK): An opensource artificial intelligence toolkit 
developed by Microsoft, (Microsoft, 2019) claims that the CNTK toolkit is commercial-grade 
quality and compatible with many programming languages and algorithms. The CNTK is 
scalable for efficiency and capable of running on CPU, GPU, and distributed environments.  
ML.NET: ML.NET framework is an opensource and cross-platform machine learning 
framework used to develop machine learning models using C# or F# languages. The ML.NET 
framework incorporates data loading, transformation, model training, and evaluation. Data 
transformation, normalization, and different machine learning algorithms, such as SymSGD, 
SDCA, FastTree, LightGBM, K-Means, SVM, and Averaged Perceptron, are supported by the 
framework. ML.NET works with other machine learning tools such as TensorFlow, 
Accord.NET, and CNTK (Microsoft, 2019a). Although ML.NET was initially released as 
recently as 2018 as an opensource machine learning component, the underlying machine 
learning components have been used for over a decade in Microsoft products such as 
Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection (ATP), Windows Defender, and Anomaly 
Detection in Azure Stream Analytics (Microsoft, 2019d, 2020).   
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 2.2.3 Classification Algorithms 
In (Choudhury & Bhowal, 2015; Garg & Khurana, 2014) machine learning classifier 
techniques are grouped into several types based on their functionality and the machine 
learning algorithms they are using. The common classification groups used in both 
Choudhury and Bhowal, and Garg and Khurana include Bayes Classifier, Functional 
Classifier, Lazy Classifier, Meta Classifier, Multi-Instance Classifier, Rules Classifier, and 
Decision Tree-based classification. Table 3 shows a list of classification algorithms in recent 
research. 
 
Table 3. Classification Algorithms and Models 
Classification Algorithm Model 
SVM Vector Space 
K-Means Euclidean Space Distance 
C4.5 Decision Tree 
J.48 Decision Tree 
Random Forest Decision Tree 
Bayes Net Graph model 
 
SVM: Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a supervised learning algorithm that 
represents features data in the form of n-dimensional vectors and gives a specific score to 
each piece of feature data as the basis of evaluation (Qi et al., 2017). SVM was first 
introduced in 1963 but became widely used in deep neural network-based learning in the 
1990s (Qi et al., 2017). The SVM algorithm uses hyperplanes to classify linear datasets. 
However, in real cases the dataset may be nonlinear. Therefore, SVM uses different kernels to 
transform initial features to higher dimensional space in order to address nonlinear classifying 
techniques. Type of kernels include Linear kernel, Polynomial, RBF (Radial basis function) 
kernel, and Sigmoid kernel (Kong et al., 2018). 
K-Means: K-Means is an unsupervised algorithm to cluster data with similar 
properties using the Euclidean space distance measurement by finding the centroid of the 
clusters (Qi et al., 2017).  
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C4.5 Algorithm: Also called Statistical Classifier, this machine learning algorithm 
builds decision trees from the training data for classification (Singh & Agrawal, 2011). 
J.48: This type of decision tree depends on the variables (features in the training data). 
The dependent variables (labels) are decided by the value of the connected nodes, which 
represent the independent variables (features). The root node contains the feature with the 
highest information gain to build the decision tree (Mehmood & Rais, 2016). 
Random Forest: This decision tree-based algorithm uses several methods to obtain 
better prediction performance (Choudhury & Bhowal, 2015).  
Bayes Net: This is a probabilistic graphical model based on the Bayes theorem to 
form a Bayesian network with each node representing a random variable. The edges between 
the nodes represent probabilistic dependencies among the random variables. Statistical 
methods are often used to compute the probability of the nodes (Choudhury & Bhowal, 2015; 
Singh & Agrawal, 2011). 
2.2.4 Performance Analysis of Classification Algorithms 
In a comparative analysis of machine learning algorithms (Singh & Agrawal, 2011), 
the C4.5 and Bayes Net showed better accuracy in IP traffic classification. The experiment 
used two different datasets with 2,800 data samples, out of which 300 samples were used for 
testing. Traffic classification using the C4.5 and Bayes Net algorithms resulted in about 94% 
accuracy. The experiment used Weka as a machine learning tool.  
In another study (Choudhury & Bhowal, 2015), several algorithms were used to 
classify network traffic to detect anomalies using Weka. The training dataset consisted of 
1,166 records with 42 features and the testing dataset consisted of 7,456 records. Analysis 
results show that Random Forest and Bayes Net algorithms yielded greater accuracy with 
91% and 90%, respectively.  
In an experiment using Weka and the NSL-KDD dataset with 94,000 training data 
instances and 48,000 instances for testing, the Random Forest classification algorithm was 
among the top-performing algorithms along with Rotation Forest, Random Tree, and Random 
Committee (Garg & Khurana, 2014). Each instance in both sets was composed of 41 features. 
The dataset contained four types of attacks: DoS (Denial of Service), R2L (Remote to Local), 
U2R (Unauthorized access to local superuser), and Probing (surveillance or others). 
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In another study (Sewak et al., 2018), Random Forest classification algorithm showed 
a greater accuracy than Deep Neural Network (DNN) algorithms for malware classification. 
The experiment used 11,308 malicious files and 2,819 benign files. The Adaptive Synthetic 
(ADASYN) technique was used to balance the training dataset classes. The analysis was 
performed on the opcodes of each instances using the Linux objdump utility. The training-
testing dataset was randomly split to the ratio of 2:1. The Python libraries Sci-Kit and Keras 
with TensorFlow were used for Random Forest and DNN, respectively. Results showed that 
Random Forest, with an accuracy of 99.78%, slightly outperformed DNN, which had an 
accuracy of 99.21%.  
A different study (Narudin et al., 2016) investigated 1,000 malware families with 49 
different families out of the 1,260 MalGenome project dataset, and the top 20 free apps from 
Google Play store as benign apps. Eleven TCP/IP-based features were extracted from the 
network traffic for training and testing. The research results showed 99% malware detection 
accuracy with Random Forest classifier algorithm.  
In a study performed on traffic data to classify attacks and normal traffic using 
supervised and unsupervised learning, K-Means classification was used for unsupervised 
learning, and SVM was used for supervised learning (Kong et al., 2018). The KDD’99 
dataset, a widely used dataset in anomaly-based detection experiments, was used with 42 
features extracted based on traffic flow (Mehmood & Rais, 2016). The experimental dataset 
consisted of four types of attacks: DoS, R2L, U2R, and Probing. Further, the result showed 
91% accuracy with SVM and 83% accuracy using K-Means. However, SVM was slower to 
predict specific attacks in the dataset than the K-Means algorithm.  
In a particular study of intrusion-detection research (Mehmood & Rais, 2016), SVM, 
Naïve Bayes classifier, J.48 decision tree, and decision table algorithms were used on the 
KDD99 dataset. The analysis result showed that each algorithm had different results in the 
classification of each of the attack classes (DoS, R2L, U2R, Probe) and normal traffic. No 
algorithm outperformed the others with a high true positive rate (TPR). The J.48 decision tree 
algorithm was found to have the highest accuracy and minimum classification error.  
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Table 4. Performance of Classification Algorithms 
Algorithm Training Data Count Testing Data Count Overall Accuracy 
C4.5 2800 300 94% 
Bayes Net 2800 300 94% 
Random Forest 1166 7456 91% 
Bayes Net 1166 7456 90% 
Random Forest 14127 4700 99.78% 
DNN 14127 4700 99.21% 
 
As summarized in Table 4, decision tree-based classification algorithms provide good 
results in the context of network traffic analysis. Based on results compiled from different 
studies, Random Forest classification shows better accuracy over the other decision tree-based 
classification algorithms and DNN in network classification for intrusion detection. 
2.3 Search Engine and Vector Space Model 
Search engines are capable of efficiently processing large volumes of data and are 
known for fast information retrieval. Search engine processes have at least two major phases: 
indexing and searching. Data structure models such as VSM are used in search engines for 
efficient data processing and document matching. In search engines, the concept of VSM is 
used to represent each document mathematically as a vector in space. Document similarity is 
based on the notion that vectors that are closer to each other are semantically similar and 
vectors that are far apart are semantically less similar (The Apache Software Foundation, 
2019).  
VSM was first developed in 1975. The idea of VSM was to represent documents with 
vectors in a document space for efficient document retrieval (Salton et al., 1975). Vectors are 
common in Artificial Intelligence and cognitive sciences (Turney & Pantel, 2010). The VSM 
can be used in classification problems such as spam Short Message Service (SMS) filters in 
the telecommunication industry (Li & Zeng, 2016). In VSM, terms in the documents are 
represented by vectors, which consist of term weights to signify the semantic value of the 
term in the document. The commonly used weighting algorithms are Term Frequency (TF) 
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and Inverse Document Frequency (IDF) (Li & Zeng, 2016). The TF-IDF weight is a statistical 
measure used to evaluate the importance of a term to the document in the collection. The 
Term Frequency (TF) is the count of terms in the document. IDF measures the uniqueness of 
the term with respect to the entire corpus (Pathak & Lal, 2017). IDF is computed from the 
total documents count and the count of documents that contain at least one occurrence of the 
term. 
𝑇𝐹𝑖 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔2(𝑡𝑓𝑖𝑗) 
Where tfij represents the frequency of term i in document j. 
 
𝐼𝐷𝐹𝑖 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔2 (
𝑁
𝑛𝑗
) + 𝐼 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔2(𝑁) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔2(𝑛𝑗) + 1 
Where N is the number of total documents and nj is the count of documents that 
contain at least one occurrence of term i. 
The measure of the distance between two vectors is the measure of similarity between 
them. The most popular distance measures for vectors includes Euclidean distance, Manhattan 
distance, Cosine similarity, Dice, and Jaccard Coefficient. Research shows that the Cosine 
similarity is the best formula for similarity measurement in search engines. With the Cosine 
formula, the length of the vectors is less relevant; what is important is the angle between them 
(Turney & Pantel, 2010). The Cosine of angle θ between vectors A and B can be expressed as:  
cos⁡(𝜃) =
A ∙ B
∥ A ∥∥ B ∥
 
As noted in (Yin et al., 2016), retrieving the most relevant result is the core problem of 
commercial search engines. The problem of relevance in search engines is beyond text 
matching. The search problem can be treated as a binary problem to filter out irrelevant 
results from relevant ones. The research work that has been tested and deployed in the Yahoo 
commercial search engine shows that adding machine learning algorithms increases 
relevance. Decision tree algorithms such as Gradient Boosting Decision Tree (GBDT) with 
logistic loss can find a decision boundary that can classify bad URLs as opposed to relevant 
ones (Yin et al., 2016). 
18 
 
Search engines can be reinforced by machine learning for accurate search results 
(Chauhan et al., 2015). There are many machine learning algorithms that can work with VSM.  
If the machine learning algorithm uses real-valued vectors, it can use vectors from VSM. 
Machine learning algorithms can handle vector comparison, and vectors from VSM may also 
be used in semi-supervised learning (Ando & Zhang, 2005). In some studies, network 
intrusion detection systems using neural networks showed better detection results than known 
intrusion detection tools like Snort (Al-Jarrah & Arafat, 2015). Neural networks also achieved 
better results over other vector-based models (Hung et al., 2017).  
2.3.1 Search Engine Libraries 
There are several commercial and opensource search engines. Google, Bing, and 
Yahoo are among the top commercial search engines. Opensource search engines include 
Lucene, Indri, Terrier, Sphinx, and Xapian. Lucene, Indri, and Terrier are the popular search 
engine libraries that are tuned up for fast execution time (Mitra et al., 2017) and support 
multiple language interfaces. 
Lucene: Lucene is an opensource fully featured search engine library with advanced 
analysis capabilities. First started in 1997 by Doug Cutting, it was  later donated to the 
Apache Software Foundation in 2001 (Białecki et al., 2012). Offering VSM and efficient 
indexing, storage, searching, and ranking functionalities, Lucene can be customized. It has a 
scalable and high-performance indexing library. Its memory requirement ranges from 1MB 
through systems with several cores. Lucene also supports concurrent searches (The Apache 
Software Foundation, 2019). Lucene is used by AOL, Comcast, Disney, Wikipedia, Twitter, 
Netflix, Instagram, and other search engines (Białecki et al., 2012; Turney & Pantel, 2010).  
Indri: An opensource search engine library that can provide text searches and 
structure query language, Indri supports multithreading and distributed search, and can run on 
a cluster of nodes for faster indexing and searching. It allows fine-grained control of searching 
and low-level access to document repositories (Van Gysel et al., 2017). 
Terrier: An opensource Java-based search engine developed at the University of 
Glasgow, Terrier supports term dependence proximity models and supervised ranking models 
via learning to rank. Learning to rank in the Terrier search engine means using multiple 
calculated features in a uniform way during ranking, and learning an appropriate method to 
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combine those features. The calculated features can be query-dependent or independent 
(University of Glasgow, 2019). 
In a study that compared the two search engines, Lucene and Indri, Indri results were 
better than Lucene for short queries; however, Lucene is faster than Indri for long queries. 
The two search engines also yield different documents, especially for short queries (Turtle et 
al., 2012). 
2.4 Network Traffic Analysis Tools 
Network traffic analysis tools involve packet capturing and analysis. Packet capturing 
is a process of collecting packets as they travel over a network. Packet capturing takes place 
in kernel space, but analysis tools run in the user space (Gracia, 2008). There are several 
network traffic analysis tools; however, this section mainly reviews the popular network 
traffic analysis tools that support packet capturing, filtering, and analysis: Microsoft Message 
Analyzer, Wireshark, NetworkMiner, Fiddler, and OpenNMS. 
2.4.1 Microsoft Message Analyzer 
The Microsoft Message Analyzer is the successor to Microsoft Network Monitor 3.4, 
used for capturing, displaying, and analyzing network traffic, events, and application log 
messages in network and other diagnostic scenarios. It can capture local or remote traffic and 
live or archived data from multiple data sources simultaneously. Highlighted features include 
automated data capturing, session filters, flexible user interface, etc. Microsoft Message 
Analyzer functionalities are enabled for PowerShell scripting environments. This includes 
stopping a trace session, saving trace session data without stopping the session, injecting a 
trace filter into a trace session at specific time, and miscellaneous scripting for remote traffic 
capturing. During a live trace session, data selection can be performed by applying session 
filters to isolated trace results for analysis. There are several session filter techniques such as 
fast filter, which operates at the kernel level; keyword filter; and Windows Filtering Platform 
(WFP) Layer set filter, which consists of kernel-mode TCP/IP stack filters that operate at the 
Transport layer. These session filter techniques allow selectively enabling or disabling of 
inbound or outbound packets at the Transport layer when capturing IPv4 or IPv6 messages. 
Other filter options include HTTP filters, which are enabled to isolate traffic based on the 
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hostname or port value. Keyword and Level filters can be used when configuring a live trace 
session that uses a system Event Tracing for a Windows (ETW) Provider (Microsoft, 2016). 
2.4.2 Wireshark 
Wireshark was first started by Gerald Combs in late 1997 with its original name, 
Ethereal. In 2006 the Ethereal project was renamed Wireshark, and version 1.0 was released 
in 2008. Wireshark is an interactive network protocol analyzer and capture tool that provides 
detailed inspection of several protocols and runs on multiple platforms. An opensource 
software, Wireshark can decrypt protocols such as SSL/TSL, WEP, WPA/WPA2, Kerberos, 
and more. Wireshark can capture traffic from many different network media types such as 
Ethernet, Wireless LAN, Bluetooth, USB, and more. Wireshark has a terminal-based version 
called TShark. TShark captures data from live traffic or from a previously saved capture file, 
prints a decoded form of the packets to the standard output, or writes packets to a file. TShark 
has several options and parameters to perform packet analysis. Without any options set, 
TShark works like Tcpdump (Wireshark, 2019). The Tcpdump tool prints out a description of 
contents of packets on a network or saves the packet data to a file. Windump is a clone of 
Tcpdump for Windows operating systems (Tcpdump, 2019). Wireshark uses Libpcap library 
to capture packets directly from the network card. Libpcap provides a high-level interface to 
network packet capturing. It was first developed by McCanne, Leres, and Jacobson in 1994 
(Gracia, 2008). Libpcap supports packet filtering at the kernel level for systems that support 
Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF).  
2.4.3 Other Tools 
These tools provide specific traffic analysis functionalities such as analyzing specific 
protocols, extract files, analyzing network status, etc. 
Telerik Fiddler: A web application debugging tool that can capture HTTP traffic 
between the client and the server, Telerik Fiddler allows users to monitor and modify HTTP 
responses and requests in transition. Fiddler provides detailed information about HTTP traffic 
and can be used for performance testing and debugging for web applications. Fiddler can also 
decrypt HTTPS traffic (Telerik, 2019). 
NetworkMiner: NetworkMiner captures and parses network packets to extract files, 
images, and other artifacts to reconstruct events that a user has received on the network.  
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Classified as a Network Forensic Analysis Tool (NFAT), NetworkMiner can process archived 
Packet Capture (PCAP) files (Netresec, 2019).  
OpenNMS: An opensource network management application that offers event and 
notification management, OpenNMS has a framework that logically groups related faults 
(alarms) into higher level objects (situations). The framework supports unsupervised machine 
learning and deep learning algorithms. OpenNMS has a web-based user interface to display 
any outages, alarms, or notifications in the network infrastructure (OpenNMS, 2019). 
CICFlowMeter: An opensource bidirectional network traffic flow generator. It can 
generate statistical features from PCAP files and live traffic. (Canadian Institute for 
Cybersecurity, 2019). CICFlowMeter will be discussed more later in the next chapters. 
2.5 Literature Review Summary 
In this section, details of signature-based and anomaly-based threat detection systems 
and widely used opensource intrusion detection systems have been discussed. In general, the 
literature review shows that anomaly-based intrusion detection is the most recent development 
in intrusion detection technologies. It is also likely the future of intrusion detection 
technologies. Specific aspects of machine learning techniques, and search engine internals 
have also been discussed. Decision tree-based classification algorithms show better attack 
classification than anomaly-based intrusion detection systems. The design of the new 
framework, which involves a custom search engine and machine learning techniques, will be 
discussed in the next chapter.  
2.5.1 Basic Design Specifications of the Proposed Framework 
In order to improve the existing traffic analysis approach for threat detection, which is 
the purpose of the research, the following specifications need to be incorporated in the 
proposed framework based on the literature review: 
1. The proposed network traffic analysis framework should support anomaly-based 
intrusion detection because anomaly-based detection approach has better detection 
capability than signature-based detection approaches. 
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2. A decision tree-based classification algorithm should be used as a primary 
classifier for machine learning because decision tree-based algorithms achieve 
greater accuracy than other algorithms. 
3. For comprehensive analysis, the proposed framework needs to use the Microsoft 
ML.NET machine learning framework because it is opensource and actively 
supported by Microsoft. It also supports the trained models of other machine 
learning tools such as TensorFlow and CNTK. Microsoft ML.NET is used by 
security tools like Windows Defender, is well documented, and supports several 
classification algorithms including decision tree-based algorithms. 
4. Lucene needs to be used as a search engine library because Lucene supports 
several functionalities, is widely used in large-scale search applications like 
Wikipedia, and is easily extensible.  
5. The proposed framework should be evaluated against a large dataset to perform 
empirical analysis on its performance and accuracy. Most studies reviewed in this 
literature review used fewer than 20,000 data instances to evaluate intrusion 
detection approaches. 
 
Chapter 2 illustrated the comparative analysis of existing cyber threat detection tools, 
intrusion detection approaches, network traffic analysis tools, and detection algorithms. This 
chapter also discussed existing machine learning and search engine technologies. Finally, this 
chapter laid out the basic specifications for the new cyber threat detection framework. 
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CHAPTER 3 
SYSTEM DESIGN  
This chapter incorporates research methodology as well as the new framework design 
from a software engineering perspective. Several architectural diagrams, algorithm designs, 
and use cases are discussed in this chapter. A prototype project analysis is included in this 
chapter in order to make design decisions on the core algorithms. 
3.1 Research Methodology 
There are three factors to consider when selecting a research approach: the research 
problem, the personal experience of the researcher, and the audience of the research. For 
example, if the problem is to identify factors that influence an outcome, then a quantitative 
approach is best. If a concept or phenomenon needs to be understood, a qualitative research 
approach is preferred (Creswell, 2014).  
This research is solution-oriented with the primary goal of improving threat detection 
system by designing new artifacts. Design science has a problem-solving paradigm that seeks 
to create new and innovative artifacts (Hevner et al., 2004). According to (Wieringa, 2014), 
design science is the design and investigation of artifacts in a specified context. Artifacts are 
designed to improve something in that context. In this research, several techniques (artifacts) 
are used to improve cyber threat detection (context) approaches. Wieringa (2014) defines 
Technical Action Research (TAR) as a way to validate the artifact in the field. TAR is artifact-
driven and part of the validation of an experimental artifact. In TAR, the researcher plays 
three roles: (a) as a technical researcher, the researcher designs a treatment intended to solve a 
class of problems; (b) as an empirical researcher, the researcher answers some validation 
questions about the treatment; (c) as a helper, the researcher applies a client-specific version 
of the treatment to help a client. In this research, the researcher designs a new approach to 
improve existing threat detection mechanisms, provides empirical evidence on the validity of 
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the new approach, and provides a means of applicability of the new approach in the field of 
cyber threat detection by designing and developing the proposed framework. 
The initial survey of (Santos & Travassos, 2009) indicates that there is an increasing 
tendency to use TAR in software engineering addressing different research topics. Wieringa 
(2014) stated that single-case mechanism experiments are useful for implementation 
evaluation in TAR because they can provide insight into the behavior of artifacts and 
problematic phenomena in the real world. Single-case experiments can be done in the lab or 
in the field. This research employs lab research for evaluation because the researcher can 
control the lab environment within the scope of this research.  
This research comprises three major phases: problem analysis, solution design, and 
evaluation and validation. The problem analysis was conducted through a literature review. In 
the literature review, existing cyber threat detection approaches such as signature-based and 
anomaly-based detection techniques were investigated. The problems of the investigated 
approaches were clearly identified. Based on the problem analysis, requirements for the new 
approach were derived. As shown in Figure 1, the new framework solution must be designed 
with respect to the identified specifications and proposed techniques. Finally, each artifact 
implementation is evaluated, and the designed solution as a whole is validated. 
 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual design of the proposed framework.    
3.2 Treatment Evaluation and Solution Validation 
Evaluation in design science research consists of evaluation of design science theories 
and artifacts (Pries-Heje et al., 2008). In this research the evaluation phase focuses on the 
newly developed artifacts such as custom search engine components and machine learning 
components. Evaluation requires researchers to demonstrate the utility, quality, and efficiency 
of artifacts using rigorous evaluation methods (Hevner et al., 2004). According to (Olan, 
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2003), validation is a process designed to ensure confidence that the program functions as 
intended. As a piece of software engineering research, software engineering phases like unit 
testing and system testing are employed in the evaluation process. Generally, validation 
involves testing. Careful testing greatly increases the confidence that a program satisfies its 
specifications. Therefore, treatment evaluation is supported by unit testing. Unit testing 
validates the correctness of program components. (Koomen & Pol, 1999). Unlike an 
observational case study, unit testing requires a unit tester to intervene in each use of the 
artifact to see “what happens” when using software development tools like debuggers. Once 
bugs are identified through unit testing, artifacts are modified for improvement until the unit 
test passes in the defined framework. System testing is applied to validate the interaction of 
artifacts and optimize efficiency of the system. 
3.3 Artifact Design and Implementation 
The proposed framework utilizes search engine capabilities such as indexing, 
searching, and VSM. The indexer and searcher components of the search engine are 
customized in order to use the VSM feature of the search engine for intrusion detection. In 
addition to the search engine, the framework uses a binary classifier engine to reinforce the 
search engine capability because a survey in the related literature shows that a single detection 
technique is not able to provide accurate detection rate and, therefore, a hybrid technique is 
suggested to increase detection accuracy (Samrin & Vasumathi, 2017). The framework has 
two major implementation phases: the training and detection phases. A high-level model of 
the framework is shown in Figure 2 (with the technical scope of the research marked in the 
dashed border). Although both the training and detection phases use a feature extractor 
component, designing a new feature extractor from live traffic is not within the scope of this 
research. Conceptual framework designs and architectural structures are provided for each 
major component of the framework in the next sections.  
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Figure 2. High level model of the framework. 
3.3.1 Training Phase 
As shown in the process design in Figure 3, the training phase involves the search 
engine, Machine Learning (ML)-based binary classifier, feature extractor, and indexer 
components. Since the framework is based on search engine technology that is capable of 
processing parallel tasks, a training task can be running during the detection phase. This 
facilitates the self-learning capability of the engine.  
 
Figure 3. Training process. 
Feature Extractor: The feature extractor parses the network traffic raw data and 
extracts features. The extracted feature dataset is used to train the custom search engine and 
the binary classifier. Feature extractor tools such as CICFlowMeter (Canadian Institute for 
Cybersecurity, 2019) can extract features from raw traffic data. CICFlowMeter is capable of 
extracting several features that can be used for anomaly-based detection techniques (Habibi 
Lashkari et al., 2017). Feature engineering is not a trivial task; generating a reliable and 
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compressive feature set is critical for anomaly-based intrusion detection systems (Chio & 
Freeman, 2018). 
Search Engine: A fully featured data retrieval engine such as Lucene is used to 
retrieve data from large datasets. Major features of the search engine include indexing, VSM, 
ranking, scoring, data storage, parallelism, and distributed deployment support.  
Indexer: The indexer is a search engine component that analyzes the classified set of 
features and systematically adds them to the index storage. Since the search engine is 
designed to process text files, the features dataset is converted to indexable text and treated as 
set of documents in the search engine. Therefore, the indexer component designed in the 
proposed framework is a customized indexer that overrides the default properties of the search 
engine, so that each feature set is stored as a vector in the VSM. 
ML Binary Classifier: This component is a machine learning-based binary classifier 
engine used to reinforce the decision engine that uses the search engine as threat detection. 
The Binary Classifier has two components: the predictor and trainer. The predictor accepts 
input feature data to determine the traffic state during detection phase. The trainer generates a 
model during the training phase. The trained model can be used to retrain the search engine 
for new data or undetermined traffic. During the training phase, both the search engine and 
the binary classifier train with the same features dataset. But during the detection phase, the 
binary classifier serves as a decision engine to retrain the search engine when the search 
engine fails to determine the state of the input traffic with high confidence. 
3.3.2 Detection Phase 
During the detection phase, the same feature extractor component that is used for 
training is used to extract features from the input traffic data. Once the feature set is extracted, 
it goes through the decision engine, as shown in the detection process design diagram in 
Figure 4. Then the decision engine uses the search engine to determine the status of the input. 
In cases when the search engine detection confidence is low, the decision engine is retrained 
by the binary classifier. 
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Figure 4. Detection process. 
Searcher: The searcher component takes the input feature data as a query, searches 
for the best matches, and provides the result to the decision engine. The searcher uses 
similarity algorithms discussed later in the Similarity Measurements section. 
Decision Engine: This component determines the nature of the input traffic based on 
the search result and decision algorithms. As indicated in Figure 5, the activity diagram of the 
decision engine, the engine accepts the features set as input and uses the searcher component 
to search for the top matches. If a threat match is found, it sends a notification to the alert 
service. If the search yields a low confidence score, the features set goes through the binary 
classifier. Depending on the binary classifier result, the input data is analyzed to retrain the 
search engine. This way the search engine learns by itself with the help of the Machine 
Learning (ML) Engine. 
 
Figure 5. Decision engine activity diagram. 
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Alert Service: This component is a notifier service used when the system detects a 
threat. This service receives an alert flag from the decision engine logs and triggers alerts. 
3.3.3 Development Tools  
Development tools and platform selection for this research are based on the 
accessibility, adaptability, and performance of the tool, and researcher’s expertise. 
Visual Studio: A software development environment that supports multiple 
programming languages and development tools, Visual Studio is a complete package for 
software development, testing, and deployment. The Visual Studio Community Edition is free 
for researchers and small teams, and supports building software using different third-party 
components, including search engine libraries, Lucene, and the machine learning framework 
ML.NET (Microsoft, 2019). 
Platforms: Windows is the primary development and testing platform. C-Sharp (C#) 
is used as a primary programming language to develop, test, and validate the framework. 
PowerShell, Python, and other scripting languages may be used in the evaluation and 
development phases. Microsoft .NET Core is used as the development platform for the 
proposed framework, which means the proposed framework is intended to run on Windows, 
macOS, and Linux as .NET Core runs on these environments. 
Search Engine Library: The popular opensource search engine library, Lucene is 
used as a core search engine. As discussed in the literature review, Lucene has several 
features, and is well tested, is extensible, and used in large-scale applications. 
Machine Learning Framework: The Microsoft machine learning framework 
ML.NET is used as a machine learning component. As discussed in the literature review, 
ML.NET is new, supports several other machine learning models, and is used by security 
tools like Windows Defender. 
The proposed cyber threat detection framework that incorporates Lucene, ML.NET, 
and training and evaluation components is intended to run on different environments but was 
designed, developed, and tested using Visual Studio on a Windows platform.  
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 3.3.4 Datasets 
As discussed in the literature review summary, the proposed framework uses an 
anomaly-based detection approach. Anomaly-based intrusion detection accuracy depends on 
the amount of collected behavior or features (Modi et al., 2013). Lack of a sufficient dataset 
impacts the accuracy of analysis and evaluation in anomaly-based IDS (Sharafaldin et al., 
2018). With the proposed approach, training the engines is the crucial step to generate models. 
The accuracy of the proposed model depends on the quality of the training data. For the 
purpose of training, evaluating each treatment implementation, and validating the overall 
solution, a wide variety of publicly available datasets, such as datasets collected by the 
Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity (Sharafaldin et al., 2018), and the Center for Applied 
Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA) datasets (CAIDA, 2019) were used. These datasets contain a 
variety of records. The performance of the Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity datasets in 
machine learning algorithms has been analyzed and evaluated (Sharafaldin et al., 2018). 
3.3.5 Similarity Measurements 
Extracted features from the training data are stored in a vector form within the VSM in 
the search engine. Vectors are stored in a multidimensional space. If the data has n features, 
the vector is represented in n dimensional space. In reality, several features can be extracted 
from single session traffic data. For instance, CICFlowMeter can extract over 80 features 
(Habibi Lashkari et al., 2017). Just to understand the similarity equation, let us assume we 
have a two-dimensional space with points representing vectors on a plane, as shown in Figure 
6. Suppose each traffic is represented by a vector on the coordinate plane, and suppose vector 
A represents an input traffic. 
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Figure 6. Vectors in two-dimensional space. 
The status of the input vector A is determined by the nearby vectors using similarity 
measurements such as Euclidean distance and Cosine similarities. While Euclidean distance 
similarity measures the distance between the two points A and B in space, Cosine similarity 
measures the angle between two vectors. 
 
Cosine similarity between vectors A and B, each with n elements can be expressed as: 
similarity(A, B) = cos(𝜃) =
A ∙ B
∥ A ∥∥ B ∥
=
∑ 𝐴𝑖 ∙ 𝐵𝑖⁡⁡
𝑛
𝑖=1
√∑ 𝐴𝑖
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Euclidean distance d between two points in space A and C can be computed as: 
𝑑(𝐴, 𝐶) = ⁡√∑(𝐴𝑖 −⁡𝐶𝑖)2
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
 
Similarity measurements produce different results. For instance, in Figure 6, vector B 
is the closest vector to the input vector A using Cosine similarity; however, point C is the 
closest point to point A using Euclidean distance. Selection of the appropriate similarity 
measurement is an experimental process. The next section discusses the results of a prototype 
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project developed to determine the appropriate similarity measurement and related algorithms. 
Similarity measurements are crucial in search engines, so a prototype project was needed to 
make the right selection.  
3.4 Prototype Project 
In software engineering, the main purpose of prototyping is for design verification of 
product development as it demonstrates the feasibility of the proposed design before 
launching the actual development. The goal of this prototype project was to assess the overall 
feasibility of the research and select the appropriate similarity algorithm used in the 
customization of the search engine VSM component. As a prototype project, a miniVSM 
component with training and prediction features was implemented from scratch. The 
prototype project was based on the hypothesis of the research, explained in short as the 
following: the nearby vectors that represent network traffic data determine the status of the 
input traffic data vector. The prototype project had data preparation, training, prediction, and 
evaluation procedures. A total of 12,000 traffic instances were involved in the training and 
evaluation, out of which 2,000 traffic instances represent attacks. The evaluation data were 
proportionally and randomly selected. Implementation of the VSM prototype involved 
building matrix of vectors from the features dataset, as shown in Listing 1. 
public static void BuildVSM(IEnumerable<string> trainingDataSet) 
{ 
    int index = 0; 
    featureVectors = new ConcurrentDictionary<int, double[]> 
                          (CONCURRENCY_LEVEL, COLLECTION_CAPACITY); 
    labelVectors = new ConcurrentDictionary<int, string> 
                          (CONCURRENCY_LEVEL, COLLECTION_CAPACITY); 
 
    foreach (string featureSet in trainingDataSet) 
    { 
        IEnumerable<string> values = featureSet.Split(','); 
        double[] vector = values.Take(FEATURES_COUNT) 
                                .Select(val => Convert.ToDouble(val)).ToArray(); 
        featureVectors.TryAdd(index, vector); 
        labelVectors.TryAdd(index, values.Last()); 
        index++; 
    } 
} 
Listing 1. Partial implementation of VSM.  
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 The VSM prototype was evaluated with a test dataset. The test dataset contains a total 
of 2,400 instances of attack and benign traffic features. The evaluation model had a simple 
prediction accuracy measure that computes the percentage of accurate predictions out of the 
total predictions, as shown in Listing 2. 
public static double EvaluateVSM(IEnumerable<string> testingDataSet) 
{ 
    int testingDataCount = testingDataSet.Count(); 
    List<(string ActualValue, string PredictedValue)> evaluationCheckList = 
          new List<(string, string)>(testingDataCount + RANDOM_PRIME_NUMBER); 
 
    foreach (var featureSet in testingDataSet) 
    { 
        IEnumerable<string> values = featureSet.Split(','); 
        double[] vector = values.Take(FEATURES_COUNT) 
                                .Select(val => Convert.ToDouble(val)).ToArray(); 
 
        string actualValue = values.Last(); 
        string predictedValue = Predict(vector); 
 
        evaluationCheckList.Add((actualValue, predictedValue)); 
    } 
     
    int accuratePredictionCount = evaluationCheckList.Where( 
                              item => item.ActualValue == item.PredictedValue 
                              ).Count(); 
    double accuracy = (double)accuratePredictionCount * 100 /  
                      (double)testingDataCount; 
    return accuracy; 
} 
Listing 2. Partial implementation of VSM evaluation. 
The prediction model uses both Cosine similarity and Euclidean similarity to measure 
the nearness value between the vectors. Listing 3 shows implementation of these similarity 
measures. 
static double EuclideanDistanceSimilarity(double[] vector1, double[] vector2) 
{ 
    double sum = 0.0; 
    int length = vector1.Length; 
    for (int i = 0; i < length; ++i) 
        sum += Math.Abs((vector1[i] - vector2[i]) * (vector1[i] - vector2[i])); 
    return Math.Sqrt(sum); 
} 
public static double CosineSimilarity(double[] vector1, double[] vector2) 
{ 
    double lengthV1 = ComputeVectorLength(vector1); 
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    double lengthV2 = ComputeVectorLength(vector2); 
    double dotProduct = ComputeDotProduct(vector1, vector2); 
    return dotProduct / (lengthV1 * lengthV2); 
} 
public static double ComputeDotProduct(double[] vector1, double[] vector2) 
{ 
    double product = 0.0; 
    if (vector1.Length == vector2.Length) 
    { 
        for (int i = 0; i < vector1.Length; i++) 
        { 
            product += vector1[i] * vector2[i]; 
        } 
    } 
    return product; 
} 
public static double ComputeVectorLength(double[] vector) 
{ 
    double length = 0.0; 
    for (int i = 0; i < vector.Length; i++) 
    { 
        length += Math.Pow(vector[i], 2); 
    } 
    return Math.Sqrt(length); 
} 
Listing 3. Implementation of similarity measures. 
 Model prediction is based on the K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN) algorithm. The KNN 
algorithm is the simplest prediction algorithm in machine learning (Chio & Freeman, 2018). 
In KNN algorithm the prediction is based on the plurality of votes of its neighbors. The input 
vector is similar to the most common class among its k nearest neighbors. Selection of the 
best value of k is heuristic. Listing 4 shows the implementation of the KNN algorithm in the 
prototype project. 
public static string Predict(double[] inputVector) 
{ 
    ConcurrentDictionary<int, double> vectorMeasures = 
    new ConcurrentDictionary<int, double>(CONCURRENCY_LEVEL, COLLECTION_CAPACITY); 
 
    Parallel.ForEach(featureVectors, (vector) => 
    { 
        if (SIMILARITY == Similarity.COSINE) 
        { 
            double cos = CosineSimilarity(inputVector, vector.Value); 
            vectorMeasures.TryAdd(vector.Key, cos); 
        } 
        else 
        { 
            //Default similarity 
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            double distance = EuclideanDistanceSimilarity(inputVector, 
                                                          vector.Value);  
            vectorMeasures.TryAdd(vector.Key, distance); 
        } 
    }); 
 
    //Sort vector measures and take the nearest K vectors to the input vector. 
    var nearestVectors = vectorMeasures.OrderBy(item => item.Value).Take(K); 
 
    //Group by label and take the majority vote among the nearest vecotors 
    var candidates = from nn in nearestVectors 
                     group nn by labelVectors[nn.Key] into g 
                     select new { Label = g.Key, Count = g.Count() }; 
 
    //Sort Candidates. The maximum vote comes first 
    candidates = candidates.OrderByDescending(item => item.Count); 
    string prediction = candidates.First().Label; 
 
    return prediction; 
} 
Listing 4. Partial implementation of prediction model and KNN algorithm. 
Running the prototype app with the prepared 12,000 traffic instances shows that the 
Euclidean distance similarity outperformed the Cosine similarity measurement in the 
miniVSM implementation. The detection accuracy was 82.63% using Cosine similarity 
whereas using Euclidean distance similarity yielded 99.42% detection accuracy. As discussed 
earlier, the purpose of the prototype is to provide insight into the new framework before 
actual development. The result of this prototype indicates the feasibility of the dataset training 
and algorithms design. However, the result also shows that the default Lucene similarity 
algorithm, Cosine similarity, is less effective than the Euclidean distance similarity.  
3.5 Deployment and Continuous Training 
While using Euclidean distance similarity measurement and KNN algorithm in the 
proposed custom search engine, the prediction confidence can be low. When this occurs, the 
ML binary classifier model is used to determine the status of the input vector; based on the 
result, the custom search engine is retrained. As discussed earlier, both the search engine and 
the ML model use the same dataset for the initial training. A larger amount of training data 
improves accuracy but consumes large storage and computational time, making it inefficient 
for real-time detection (Modi et al., 2013). This is true for both the ML engine and the search 
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engine. With the proposed technique, the search engine has an advantage over the ML engine 
as it can update itself while it is running without destroying the model. 
Another advantage of using such a search engine technique is that the indexed data 
can be stored and searched in distributed environments using parallel multisearchers, which 
also means the model can be consumed as a service by several client hosts. The detection 
framework can also be deployed on a single server.  
3.6 Summary 
In this chapter, the design of the new framework and its components has been 
described. Depending on the deployment option, the new framework can serve to analyze 
traffic coming to the local area network or to a single host. The framework can work with live 
traffic or previously captured traffic data. As shown in Figure 7, the tapped network traffic 
goes to the feature processor to produce a feature set and pass it to the threat detection engine. 
The threat detection engine uses its two models (search engine and machine learning) to 
determine the status of the traffic. The search engine model learns the incidents when 
necessary. If a threat is detected, the detection engine notifies the alert service, then the alert 
service dispatches the alert message to connected client apps. Similarity measurement is the 
core algorithm of the search engine model. Development tools and frameworks, such as 
Visual Studio, .NET Core, Lucene, ML.NET, and datasets selections, have also been 
discussed. The prototype project shows that Euclidean distance similarity is better than Cosine 
similarity, the default similarity in the Lucene search engine library. 
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Figure 7. Process flow design. 
This chapter incorporated research methodology as well as the new framework design 
from a software engineering perspective. Several architectural diagrams, algorithm designs, 
and use cases were discussed in this chapter. A prototype project analysis was included in this 
chapter to make design decisions on the core algorithms. 
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CHAPTER 4 
SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT 
This chapter discusses the technical details and implementations of techniques and 
algorithms used to develop the proposed framework as designed in Chapter 3. This chapter 
involves mathematical analysis and the development of algorithms and components. The 
proposed framework is divided into several components. Each component is developed in 
such a way that it can be separately tested and, therefore, is less dependent on other 
components. The major components of the framework include the data processor, custom 
search engine, ML based Binary Classifier Engine, decision engine, and alert service. The 
component development process involves subcomponents, implementations of algorithms, 
and procedures. 
4.1 Data Processor 
The data processing task involves converting raw PCAP files into features data, and 
partitioning, sampling, and balancing datasets. Figure 8. Data processor process flow 
diagramFigure 8 shows the process flow of the data processor component. The raw data 
contains two kinds of classes: malicious traffic data and benign traffic data. Feature datasets 
go through the data balancing process when the classes are not proportional; data balancing 
reduces the issue of class imbalance. Both undersampling and oversampling the training data 
impacts the accuracy of the detection. Undersampling can be mitigated by intelligently 
generating synthetic data for minority classes, which is also referred to as oversampling. 
Different resampling techniques have different characteristics (Chio & Freeman, 2018), and 
therefore, the best strategy is determined by running different experiments. To start the 
training process the initial dataset is assumed to be adequate, then based on the result, 
different sampling techniques such as semisupervised learning may be used. In 
semisupervised learning, the initial training model can be used to generate an additional 
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training dataset from unlabeled data. Predictions with the highest confidence are considered 
correctly labeled and added to the training data.  
 
 
Figure 8. Data processor process flow diagram. 
4.1.1 Feature Engineering 
Feature extraction is the crucial step in anomaly detection. Features depend on the 
intrusion detection domain; host intrusion detection and network intrusion detection systems 
require different feature datasets. This research focuses on building network intrusion 
detection; therefore, features are extracted from the network traffic data. The CICFlowMeter 
tool is used to extract features from traffic data. According to the documentation (Canadian 
Institute for Cybersecurity, 2019), the CICFlowMeter uses WinPcap, the standard Windows 
packet capture library, to capture network packets. In addition to the packet header and footer, 
CICFlowMeter examines signals and statistics about the traffic. Version 4.0 of CICFlowMeter 
can generate 84 different features including duration, number of packets, number of bytes, 
length of packets, and so forth in both forward and reverse directions. CICFlowMeter is 
developed in Java and can run on Windows and Linux environments. Although 
CICFlowMeter can generate features from live traffic, extracting features from live traffic is 
beyond the scope of this research. Therefore, precollected PCAP files are used to generate 
features datasets for training in this project.   
The feature extractor method uses the input directory that contains PCAP files to 
process the extracted features and the output directory to save them. Extracted features are 
saved in Comma Separated Value (CSV) format. Since CICFlowMeter is developed in Java, 
there is no direct Java code execution from C#. Therefore, the feature extractor method uses 
Windows system process components. The method starts a command prompt process by 
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passing a batch file that accepts the directory values as parameters. The batch file then starts 
the CICFlowMeter executables. The output of the CICFlowMeter executables are redirected 
to the host process console screen as shown in Listing 5. 
public static void ExtractFeatures() 
{ 
    ProcessStartInfo processStartInfo = new ProcessStartInfo 
    { 
        FileName =  $"{AppConfigSettings.CicFlowMeterPath}cfm.bat", 
        Arguments = $"\"{AppConfigSettings.InputPcapFileDirectory}\" " + 
                    $"\"{AppConfigSettings.FeaturesDataDirectory}\"", 
        WorkingDirectory = AppConfigSettings.FeaturesDataDirectory, 
        Verb = "runas", 
        UseShellExecute = false, 
        RedirectStandardOutput = true 
    }; 
 
    Process cicFlowMeterProcess = new Process 
    { 
        StartInfo = processStartInfo 
    }; 
 
    cicFlowMeterProcess.OutputDataReceived +=  
           new DataReceivedEventHandler((sender, e) => 
            { 
                if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(e.Data)) 
                { 
                    Console.WriteLine(e.Data); 
                } 
            }); 
 
    cicFlowMeterProcess.Start(); 
    cicFlowMeterProcess.BeginOutputReadLine(); 
    cicFlowMeterProcess.WaitForExit(); 
    cicFlowMeterProcess.Close(); 
} 
Listing 5. Feature Extractor method implementation. 
4.1.2 Data Balancer 
Implementation of the data balancer depends on the accuracy of the detection result 
and initial dataset size. Data balancing is not important when adequate and proportional 
training data are available. Therefore, this component is implemented during the evaluation 
phase whenever necessary. 
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4.1.3 Data Partitioning 
The data partitioning process involves data preparation, randomization, training-
testing data selection, normalization, and data formatting.  
Data Preparation: The feature data preparation task reads all the extracted features, 
cleans invalid records, removes duplicates, and generates a list of instances with labels and 
their descriptions. Label descriptions are used by the custom search engine during indexing. 
The raw feature data reading is implemented as shown in Listing 6. The data splitter method 
is then used on the prepared feature data to generate engine-specific training data. 
public static void ReadRawFeatureData(string fileDirectory = "",  
                                      int maxGroupSize = 10000000) 
{ 
   char[] separators = {',' }; 
    int errorCounter = 0; 
    string directory = AppConfigSettings.RawDataDirectory; 
    if (!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(fileDirectory)) 
        directory = fileDirectory; 
    var files = Directory.GetFiles(directory, "*.csv"); 
 
    List<string> sampleLines = new List<string>(); 
    foreach (string file in files) 
    { 
        
        string fileName = Path.GetFileNameWithoutExtension(file); 
        sampleLines.Add(fileName); 
        Console.WriteLine($"Processing: {fileName}"); 
        var dataLines = File.ReadLines(file) 
                            .Where(line => !(line.Contains("Infinity") 
                                          || line.Contains("NaN"))).Distinct(); 
        sampleLines.AddRange(dataLines.Take(5));      
         
        Console.WriteLine($"Total distinct records = {dataLines.Count()}");        
        
        dataLines = dataLines.Skip(1); 
        
        Console.WriteLine("Data selection"); 
        var attackDataLines = dataLines.Where(l => !l.ToLower() 
                              .Contains("benign")).Take(maxGroupSize).ToList() 
        int attackInstanceCount = attackDataLines.Count; 
        Console.WriteLine($"{attackInstanceCount} - " + 
               $"attack instances found. Selecting random benign instances..."); 
        int benignInstanceCount = (int)(attackInstanceCount * 1.5); 
        var benignDataLines = dataLines.Where(l => l.ToLower().Contains("benign")) 
                                       .OrderBy(r => Guid.NewGuid()) 
                                       .Take(benignInstanceCount).ToList(); 
 
        Console.WriteLine("Merging instances..."); 
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        var entireDataLines = attackDataLines.Union(benignDataLines); 
        Console.WriteLine($"{entireDataLines.Count()} - " + 
                          $"total instances found."); 
         
                         
        int dataCounter = 1; 
        ConcurrentDictionary<int, string> instances =  
                                         new ConcurrentDictionary<int, string>(); 
 
         
        Parallel.ForEach(entireDataLines, line => 
        { 
            var featureItems = line.Split(separators);                    
            if (!featureItems.Any(f => string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(f))) 
            { 
                var featuresList = featureItems.Take(featureItems.Count() - 1); 
                var label = featureItems.Last().Trim().ToLower(); 
                label = Regex.Replace(label, @"[^a-z]|\s+", "-") 
                             .Replace("---", "-").Replace("--", "-"); 
                var normalizedLabel = label == "benign" ?  
                                      benignLabelValue : attackLabelValue; 
               
                int featureLength = featuresList.Count();                       
                string featureLine = string.Empty; 
                try 
                { 
                    for (int i = 0; i < featureLength; i++) 
                    { 
                        if (!excludedColumnIndexes.Contains(i)) 
                        { 
                            double val = Convert.ToSingle(featuresList 
                                                          .ElementAt(i)); 
                            string fVal = val.ToString(); 
                            featureLine += fVal + ",";                             
                        } 
                    } 
 
                    featureLine = featureLine.Trim(' ', ','); 
                    int totalFeatureSize = featureLine.Split(separators).Length; 
                     
                    if (!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(featureLine)) 
                    { 
                        instances.TryAdd(dataCounter,  
                            (featureLine + "|" + normalizedLabel + "," + label) 
                            .Trim(' ', ',')); //features|labels 
                    } 
                    dataCounter++; 
                    if (dataCounter % 10000 == 0) 
                        Console.WriteLine($"{dataCounter}"); 
                } 
                catch (Exception ex) 
                { 
                    Console.WriteLine(ex.Message); 
                    Console.WriteLine(line); 
                    errorCounter++; 
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                } 
            } 
        } 
        ); 
        Console.WriteLine($"Saving {fileName}.txt ..."); 
        File.WriteAllLines(directory + fileName + "-labeled.txt", 
                           instances.Select(l => l.Value));                
    } 
} 
Listing 6. Implementation of the data preparation method. 
Data Splitting: In machine learning the training data and the testing data should be 
distinct. Usually thirty percent of the entire dataset goes to testing, and the remaining seventy 
percent is used for training. The test data fraction can be adjustable depending on the training 
data size. As shown in the implementation code in Listing 7, first, the prepared dataset is split 
into two groups: benign instances and attack instances. Then the test dataset is extracted from 
each group based on the test-fraction value. This step generates four groups of datasets: 
benign and attack instances for training and testing. Data selection is through randomization. 
In the last step, the training and testing datasets of each of the benign and attack datasets are 
merged and shuffled. This step generates two datasets, training and testing, and each group 
contains both attack and benign instances. 
private static void PrepareDateset(int instanceCount) 
{             
    IEnumerable<string> entireDataLines = ReadFeatureData(); 
 
    //Split datasets into attack and benign instances 
    var benignInstances = entireDataLines.Where(item =>  
                              Regex.IsMatch(item, @"\|" + benignLabelValue)); 
    var attackInstances = entireDataLines.Where(item =>  
                              Regex.IsMatch(item, @"\|" + attackLabelValue)); 
 
    //Make sure there is no intersection between the datasets 
    int intersection = benignInstances.Intersect(attackInstances).Count(); 
    Debug.Assert(intersection == 0, "Invalid benign-attack instances"); 
 
    int totalBenignInstances = benignInstances.Count(); 
    int totalAttackInstances = attackInstances.Count(); 
 
     
 
    //Determine the train-test benign data proportion 
    int testBenignInstancesCount = (int)(totalBenignInstances * TEST_FRACTION); 
    int trainingBenignInstancesCount =  
        totalBenignInstances - testBenignInstancesCount; 
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    //Determine the train-test attack data proportion 
    int testAttackInstancesCount = (int)(totalAttackInstances * TEST_FRACTION); 
    int trainingAttackInstancesCount =  
        totalAttackInstances - testAttackInstancesCount; 
 
    //Generate random data 
    IEnumerable<string> testAttackInstances = attackInstances.OrderBy(r =>  
                         Guid.NewGuid()).Take(testAttackInstancesCount).ToList(); 
    IEnumerable<string> trainingAttackInstances = attackInstances.Except( 
                                                        testAttackInstances); 
 
    //Make sure there is no intersection between the datasets 
    intersection = testAttackInstances.Intersect(trainingAttackInstances).Count() 
    Debug.Assert(intersection == 0, "Invalid training-test attack instances"); 
 
    IEnumerable<string> testBenignInstances = benignInstances.OrderBy(r =>  
                          Guid.NewGuid()).Take(testBenignInstancesCount).ToList() 
    IEnumerable<string> trainingBenignInstances = benignInstances.Except( 
                                                        testBenignInstances); 
 
    //Make sure there is no intersection between the datasets 
    intersection = testBenignInstances.Intersect(trainingBenignInstances).Count() 
    Debug.Assert(intersection == 0, "Invalid training-test benign instances"); 
 
    //Merge and shuffle data 
    var trainingInstances = trainingAttackInstances 
               .Union(trainingBenignInstances).OrderBy(r => Guid.NewGuid()); 
    var testingInstances = testAttackInstances.Union(testBenignInstances) 
                                              .OrderBy(r => Guid.NewGuid()); 
 
    //Make sure there is no intersection between the datasets 
    intersection = trainingInstances.Intersect(testingInstances).Count(); 
    Debug.Assert(intersection == 0, "Invalid training-test instances"); 
 
    Console.WriteLine($"            Benign\t\tAttack"); 
    Console.WriteLine($"Training\t{trainingBenignInstancesCount}\t" + 
                      $"\t{trainingAttackInstancesCount}"); 
    Console.WriteLine($"Testing\t{testBenignInstancesCount}\t" + 
                      $"\t{testAttackInstancesCount}"); 
 
    //Geenrate and save ML compatible datasets 
    File.WriteAllLines(AppConfigSettings.MlTrainingDataPath,  
                       GenerateMLCompatibleData(trainingInstances)); 
    File.WriteAllLines(AppConfigSettings.MlTestingDataPath,  
                       GenerateMLCompatibleData(testingInstances)); 
 
    //Generate and save SE compatible datasets 
    File.WriteAllLines(AppConfigSettings.SeTrainingDataPath,  
                       GenerateSECompatibleData(trainingInstances)); 
    File.WriteAllLines(AppConfigSettings.SeTestingDataPath,  
                       GenerateSECompatibleData(testingInstances));     
} 
Listing 7. Implementation of the data split method. 
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There are two detection engines in the proposed framework: the ML engine and the 
custom search engine. Both engines use different data formats. The ML engine can process 
CSV files and text files without further customization. But the search engine requires a further 
data preparation step, discussed in detail next. 
4.2 Custom Search Engine Data Preparation 
The primary use of a search engine is data mining, so it requires each data instance in 
the form of text, which is called a document in search engine terminology. During indexing, 
the indexer generates a multidimensional term-frequency vector for each document. The term 
frequency is calculated from the document. For instance, the text “the red fox and the red cat 
are smart” is stored as a term-frequency vector within the search engine VSM, as shown in 
Table 5. Articles and other stop words are not analyzed by default. 
Table 5. Term Frequency Table of a Sample Text 
Term red fox cat smart 
Frequency 2 1 1 1 
 
One of the main artifacts in this research is the customization of a search engine 
library to make it function as a threat detection engine. The customized search engine is 
expected to store vectors generated from traffic data features. For instance, the customized 
search engine should store the traffic data that contains only port number 80 and payload size 
4000 bytes in its internal vector space model, as shown in Table 6.  
 
Table 6. Feature Value Table of Sample Traffic Data Features 
Feature port payload_size   
Value 80 4000   
 
The default Lucene search engine indexer expects the terms “port” and “payload_size” 
to be repeated 80 and 4,000 times, respectively, in the text to generate values, as shown in 
Table 6. Generating the expected vector space model by repeating terms in the documents is 
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not an efficient approach, particularly for traffic data with several features. Therefore, the 
default indexer needs to be customized to generate the required vector from well-formatted 
text data like “port|80 payload_size|4000”, where the numbers indicate the frequency/value of 
the term/feature. Customization of the Lucene indexer will be discussed in detail later in the 
next section. Hence, the training data for the search engine should be prepared as a list of 
well-formatted text for efficient indexing. Listing 8 shows how the training and testing 
datasets are reprocessed for the custom search engine indexer. Feature values are rounded to 
integers because the search engine processes these values as frequency. Each feature is 
boosted by one to ensure that every feature is included in the search during the detection 
phase. However, this might change during code optimization and will be discussed later in 
Chapter 5. Case study.  
private static IEnumerable<string> GenerateSECompatibleData( 
                                         IEnumerable<string> instanceLines) 
{ 
    List<string> indexableLines = new List<string>(); 
 
    foreach(string line in instanceLines) 
    { 
        string[] featureLabel = line.Split('|'); 
        string[] features = featureLabel[0].Split(','); 
 
        string labels = featureLabel[1];                      
        string indexableLine = string.Empty; 
         
        int featuresLength = features.Length; 
        int featureCounter = 1; 
 
        for(int i =0; i<featuresLength; i++) 
        { 
            if(!EngineConstants.EXCLUDED_FEATURE_INDEXES.Contains(i)) 
            { 
                //Convert string to float and round to the ceiling integer 
                int fVal = (int)Math.Ceiling(Convert.ToSingle(features[i])); 
                fVal = Math.Abs(fVal); 
                 
                //fVal += 1; //Boost all by 1; this sets the minimum frequency to 
                //generate n-dimensional vector which results in low performance. 
                //Please read section 5.2.4 Variable Vector Dimension for details.  
                if (fVal > 0) 
                { 
                                  // ሀ|v1 ሁ|v2 ሂ|v3 … 
               indexableLine += $"{ETHIOPIC_ALPHABETS[featureCounter++]}|{fVal} "; 
                } 
            } 
        } 
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        indexableLine = indexableLine.Trim(); 
        indexableLine += "," + labels.Replace(",", "|"); 
        indexableLines.Add(indexableLine.Trim().Replace("  ", " ")); 
    } 
 
    return indexableLines; 
} 
Listing 8. Custom search engine-compatible data preparation method. 
4.2.1 Feature Name Representation 
Feature names can serve as axis names in the feature-value VSM. Feature names can 
be the actual feature names of the traffic such as “port”, “payload_size”, and so on. The 
feature value tokenizer, which will be discussed later, iterates through each character of the 
feature name during tokenization and while splitting the feature name from the feature value. 
If the traffic has several features, longer names consume memory and disk space, and the 
tokenizer could be slow as it iterates through every character. Therefore, using shorter names 
makes the VSM more efficient. One approach could be using a single character to represent a 
feature name like (a|v1 b|v2 c|v3 . . .). It only takes one byte to store an English alphabet 
character in memory; however, English alphabet characters are limited in number, and the 
approach fails to support models with several features. To support large models with several 
features, a script that contains a large number of alphabet characters and consumes less space 
in memory is needed. According to Unicode Standard 12.1, there are a total of 495 assigned 
Ethiopic characters including supplemental and extended versions. Excluding the tonal marks, 
numerals, and punctuation characters, there are 473 different pronounceable Ethiopic 
characters (Unicode, 2019). Ethiopic characters are used by Ethiopian languages such as 
Amharic, Geez, Tigrinya, and others. Each Ethiopic character takes two bytes in memory. 
There are other language scripts such as Chinese, Japanese, Korean (CJK Unified Ideographs 
Extension B) that contain several thousands of assigned characters but require more than two 
bytes to represent each character in memory. Using Ethiopic characters for feature names 
allows each feature name in a network traffic data that contains up to 473 features to be 
processed with a single character name in the search engine model. This means the model can 
grow up to a 473-dimensional vector space. Ethiopic characters are enough to represent the 
features in the dataset and provide enough space for future expansion. When using Ethiopic 
characters for feature names, the prepared dataset looks like the following: (ሀ|v1 ሁ|v2 ሂ|v3 
48 
 
…). Note that the same data generator method shown in Listing 8 is used to generate the 
custom search engine compatible data during the training and the detection phases. 
4.3 Custom Search Engine 
A search engine is an information retrieval system that can retrieve data efficiently. In 
general, a search engine involves two steps: indexing and searching. Indexing is a process of 
collecting metadata about the raw data and storing it in a systematic way for efficient 
searching. As discussed in Chapter 2, Apache Lucene is a popular opensource search engine 
library. Lucene is implemented in different programming languages such as Java, C#/.NET, 
and Python. In this section we focus on the customization of the C# version of Lucene, also 
known as Lucene.NET. At the time of this writing, the latest .NET version of Lucene is 4.8.0, 
which is behind the current Java version, which is 8.1.1. To make the Lucene library function 
as a threat detection engine, the core components such as the indexer, analyzers, searcher, and 
similarity should be customized. Customization depends on the Lucene platform and its 
version. For instance, the Java Lucene supports indexing custom term frequencies since 
version 7.0,1 but this capability does not exist in the Lucene.NET. Lucene is an extendable 
search engine library. Figure 9 shows the basic customization architecture of Lucene to make 
it function as a threat detection engine. The customized engine is intended to store the feature 
data in the form of feature-value vectors within the Lucene Index Store and apply the custom 
searcher that uses a special scoring algorithm to find the best matching vectors to the input 
traffic feature data. Each component customization will be discussed in detail in the next 
sections.    
 
 
1 https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/LUCENE-7854 
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Figure 9. Lucene customization basic architecture. 
4.3.1 Feature Analyzer 
In Lucene library, the purpose of the Analyzer is to build tokens to extract index terms 
from the input text. The process of analysis converts the input text into indexable/searchable 
tokens. Analyzer uses Tokenizer and Token Filter components. The purpose of customizing 
the Analyzer is to convert the input traffic feature data into indexable feature tokens with the 
feature value as an attribute. Then the value attribute is used by the indexer to build a feature-
value vector. The custom Analyzer, hereafter called Feature Analyzer, extends the default 
Lucene Analyzer, and uses a custom token filter called Feature Value Token Filter as shown 
in Listing 9. As discussed in the data processing section, the search engine indexable data are 
provided in the form of a space-separated set of feature names along with its value 
concatenated by pipeline character (f1|v1 f2|v2, f3|v3, …).  The Feature Analyzer first splits 
each feature and value combination by using the Lucene built in WhitespaceTokenizer.  
public class FeatureAnalyzer : Analyzer 
{ 
    protected override TokenStreamComponents CreateComponents(string fieldName,  
                                                              TextReader reader) 
    { 
        Tokenizer source = new WhitespaceTokenizer(LuceneVersion.LUCENE_48,  
                                                   reader); 
        FeatureValueTokenFilter filter = new FeatureValueTokenFilter(source); 
        return new TokenStreamComponents(source, filter); 
    } 
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}     
Listing 9. Partial implementation of Feature Analyzer. 
The Feature Value Token Filter splits the feature and its value, and stores them as term 
attributes and frequency attributes, respectively. Note that the term-frequency and feature-
value terminologies are used interchangeably in this context. Lucene treats feature as a term, 
and value as a frequency in its internal structure. The Feature Value Token Filter extends the 
default Lucene TokenFilter class and overrides the IncrementToken method, which splits the 
feature and its values for each token as shown in Listing 10. This implementation was adapted 
from the Java implementation of DelimitedTermFrequencyTokenFilter.2  
public sealed class FeatureValueTokenFilter : TokenFilter 
{ 
    public static char DEFAULT_DELIMITER = '|'; 
    private char delimiter; 
    private ICharTermAttribute featureAtt; 
    private IFeatureValueAttribute featureValueAtt; 
 
    public FeatureValueTokenFilter(TokenStream input) : 
                         this(input, DEFAULT_DELIMITER) 
    { 
        featureAtt = m_input.AddAttribute<ICharTermAttribute>(); 
        featureValueAtt = m_input.AddAttribute<IFeatureValueAttribute>(); 
    } 
    public FeatureValueTokenFilter(TokenStream input, char delimiter) :  
                                   base(input) 
    { 
        this.delimiter = delimiter; 
    } 
 
    public override bool IncrementToken() 
    { 
        if (m_input.IncrementToken()) 
        { 
            char[] buffer = featureAtt.Buffer; 
            int length = featureAtt.Length; 
            for (int i = 0; i < length; i++) 
            { 
                if (buffer[i] == delimiter) 
                { 
                    //Sets the feature to be the value before the delimiter 
                    featureAtt.Length = i; 
                    i++; 
                     
 
2 https://lucene.apache.org/core/7_0_0/analyzers-
common/org/apache/lucene/analysis/miscellaneous/DelimitedTermFrequencyTokenFilter.html  
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                    //Sets the feature value to be the value after the delimiter 
                    featureValueAtt.FeatureValue = ArrayUtil.ParseInt32(buffer,  
                                                                      i,  
                                                                      length - i); 
                    return true; 
                } 
            } 
            return true; 
        } 
        return false; 
    } 
} 
Listing 10. Implementation of the Feature Value Token Filter. 
4.3.2 Custom Indexer 
Lucene has an Index Writer class that is used to create and maintain the index. The 
IndexWriter class is initialized by setting the index directory that is used to create or append 
indexes; the configuration setting is shown in Listing 11. The custom analyzer can be 
assigned to the Index Writer in the configuration. 
using (FSDirectory directory = FSDirectory.Open(indexDirectory)) 
{ 
    var freatureAnalyzer = new FeatureAnalyzer(); 
    var indexConfig = new IndexWriterConfig(LuceneVersion.LUCENE_48, 
                                            freatureAnalyzer); 
 
    //… 
} 
Listing 11. Assigning Feature Analyzer to the Index Writer. 
The Index Writer configured with Feature Analyzer requires the custom indexing 
process chain to read the frequency/value attribute added to each feature/term token. In 
addition to the feature-value data, metadata of the traffic such as attack type can be stored in 
the index during the training phase, which is used to determine the details of the input traffic 
later during the detection phase. Customizing the Lucene.NET 4.8 indexing chain is a very 
convoluted process and involves customization of several components such as 
TermFrequencyAttribute, FieldInvertState, DocInverterPerField 
FreqProxTermsWriterPerField, TermVectorsConsumerPerField, and TermsHashPerField.  
The customized indexing chain generates a feature-value vector for each piece of 
traffic data and stores it in the index directory. As shown in the customization architecture in 
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Figure 9, the searcher component uses the analyzer to search the stored index. In Lucene, 
searching depends on the similarity algorithms. There are several built-in similarity 
algorithms in Lucene such as TFIDFSimilarity, BM25Similarity, IBSimilarity, LMSimilarity, 
etc. TFIDFSimilarity is the default similarity in Lucene. The purpose of the similarity 
algorithm in the searcher is to score the relevancy of the stored data to the search query. 
 Lucene.NET has a component called Lucene.NET.Classification, which is used to 
classify text documents into groups. This component uses different algorithms such as KNN 
and Naïve Bayes. Although this component uses KNN or Naïve Bayes algorithms, the internal 
classification technique is based on “More-Like-This” algorithm. In Lucene search, More-
Like-This algorithm is used to generate similar queries. A typical example of a More-Like-
This algorithm is providing similar search suggestions, and “do you mean . . .” suggestions in 
search engines such as Google. Similar to the implementation in Lucene.NET, More-Like-
This algorithm internally uses TFIDFSimilarity for document matching. The built-in 
classification implementation in the Lucene library does not function as a binary classifier for 
threat detection because the scoring algorithm is TFIDFSimilarity, which is based on Cosine 
similarity, term frequency, and inverse document frequency. TIFIDFSimilarity does not 
consider all the document terms to match with the query; this results in a very low detection 
accuracy if used as threat detection because it does not consider all the traffic data features in 
the search. Therefore, a custom similarity algorithm is required. 
4.3.3 Custom Similarity  
TFIDFSimilarity is based on Cosine similarity algorithm with VSM. In VSM, 
documents are represented as weighted vectors in a multidimensional space. In Chapter 3, we 
saw that Euclidean distance similarity outperformed the Cosine similarity using the KNN 
algorithm in a VSM-based intrusion detection prototype project. Euclidean similarity is not 
implemented in Lucene. Therefore, we need to implement Euclidean similarity by extending 
the base similarity component of Lucene.NET.  
The base similarity class of Lucene, named SimilarityBase, provides a simple 
Application Programming Interface (API) for its derivative classes. Subclasses that extend 
SimilarityBase must apply their scoring formula by overriding the Score method. The Score 
method provides basic statistics of the query term, the matching term stored frequency, and 
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the document length, as shown in Listing 12. Basic properties of the term called BasicStats 
contain the field name of the document containing the matching term, the matching term 
frequency, total number of occurrences of the term across all documents, document 
frequency, query boost value, etc.   
public sealed class EuclideanDistanceSimilarity : SimilarityBase 
{ 
    public override float Score(BasicStats stats, float freq, float docLen) 
    { 
        throw new NotImplementedException();  
    } 
 
    public override string ToString() 
    { 
        return "EuclideanDistanceSimilarity"; 
    } 
} 
Listing 12. Extending Lucene Similarity Base. 
The Euclidean distance formula is the shortest distance between two points in a vector 
space. In terms of Lucene scoring, the Euclidean distance can be expressed as: 
𝑑 = ⁡√∑(𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑠. 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞)2
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Where n is the number of total terms/features. 
The Score method exposes only the stored term frequency (freq), and the query term 
frequency that can be retrieved from stats.TotalBoost. The total terms and the entire vector 
context are not available to apply the summation and square root operations in this method. 
The total score of the document is calculated in the document scorers. Therefore, the 
Euclidean distance formula as it is cannot be implemented in the Score method. It is possible 
to compute the Euclidean distance formula in the document scorer components of Lucene 
such as Collectors. However, customizing the internals of document scorers is more involved. 
Therefore, we need to customize the Euclidean distance formula to fit into the Score method 
without losing the context. Let us start the customization by squaring both sides of the 
Euclidean distance equation, which gives us: 
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𝑑2 =⁡∑(𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑠. 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞)2
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Since the summation can be computed by the document score collector components, 
what we need to implement in the Score method is the score of the individual term score. If 
we compute a term score s as: 
𝑠⁡ = ⁡ (𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑠. 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞)2 
We obtain the total document score of 𝑑2, which is the square of the Euclidean 
distance. The purpose of measuring the Euclidean distance d of the given query vector is to 
find the nearest K vectors in the vector space to apply the KNN or other suitable algorithms 
for classification. What we achieved so far is the square of the Euclidean distance. However, 
we do not know if the square of Euclidean distance 𝑑2 results in the same search result as 
Euclidean distance d. Therefore, we must prove that measuring the squared Euclidean 
distance 𝑑2 produces the same nearest K vectors in the same order achieved by measuring 
Euclidean distance d. Finding the nearest vectors is attained by applying an inequality 
operation (less than or greater than) on the values. That means, for stored vectors v1 and v2, 
and query vector vq, if d1 is the distance between vq and v1, and d2 is the distance between vq 
and v2, and if d1 is less than d2, then we say v1 is nearer to vq. What if 𝑑12 is less than 𝑑22? 
Is v1 still be nearer to vq? This can be formulated as a theorem, and proving this theorem 
verifies the correctness of the Score calculation. 
Theorem: For two Euclidean distances d1 and d2, if  𝑑1⁡ ≤ 𝑑2, then 𝑑12 ≤ 𝑑22. 
Proof: 
1:⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑑1, 𝑑2⁡ > 0⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ ……… ⁡⁡⁡𝑏𝑜𝑡ℎ⁡𝑑1⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑑2⁡𝑎𝑟𝑒⁡𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 
2:⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑑1 ≤ ⁡𝑑2⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ ……… ⁡⁡𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 
3:⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑑1 ∗ 𝑑1 ≤ ⁡𝑑2 ∗ 𝑑1⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ ……… ⁡⁡𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑦⁡𝑏𝑜𝑡ℎ⁡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑠⁡𝑏𝑦⁡𝑑1 
4:⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑑2 ∗ 𝑑1 ≤ ⁡𝑑2 ∗ 𝑑2⁡⁡ …⁡⁡(1⁡&⁡2)⁡&⁡𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 
5:⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑑1 ∗ 𝑑1 ≤ ⁡𝑑2 ∗ 𝑑1 ≤ ⁡𝑑2 ∗ 𝑑2⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ ……… ⁡⁡⁡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔⁡(3)⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡(4) 
6:⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑑1 ∗ 𝑑1 ≤ ⁡𝑑2 ∗ 𝑑2⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ ……… ⁡⁡⁡𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 
7:⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑑12 ≤ 𝑑22 ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡… . . . . .⁡⁡∎ 
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Furthermore, since ⁡∀⁡𝑑1, 𝑑2⁡ > 0 ∶ ⁡𝑑1 ≤ ⁡𝑑2⁡⇒ 𝑑12 ≤ 𝑑22, the function ⁡𝑓(𝑑) =
⁡𝑑2 is a monotonically increasing function for d > 0. This implies that both the Euclidean 
distance and the square of Euclidean distance formulas produce the same set of K nearest 
vectors in VSM because the comparison yields the same result. Therefore, the Score formula 
of the Euclidean distance similarity can be computed as: 
𝑠⁡ = ⁡ (𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑠. 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞)2 
Where s is score, 
 stats.TotalBoost is the term frequency in the query, and 
 freq is the term frequency in the matching document. 
The Score method of the Euclidean distance similarity can be implemented as shown 
in Listing 13. Notice that the Score method implementation returns a negative value. This is 
intentional because in the nearest vector search, the minimum distance has higher relevancy. 
By default, Lucene searching sorts search results by descending score value, which means the 
farthest vector appears first. So, switching the sign reverses the search relevancy score, and 
the nearest vector appears first in the search result. 
public sealed class EuclideanDistanceSimilarity : SimilarityBase 
{ 
    public override float Score(BasicStats stats, float freq, float docLen) 
    { 
        return - (stats.TotalBoost - freq) * (stats.TotalBoost - freq);     
    } 
 
    public override string ToString() 
    { 
        return "EuclideanDistanceSimilarity";            
    } 
} 
Listing 13. Implementation of Score method in Euclidean distance similarity. 
Since the square root function, 𝑓(𝑥) = ⁡√𝑥 is also a monotonically increasing function 
for all 𝑥⁡ > ⁡0, if we apply the square root on the score equation, it can be reduced to the 
arithmetic difference between the term frequencies as: 
𝑠⁡ = 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑠. 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞 
However, this may result in negative values when the stored frequency is greater than 
the query term frequency. Therefore, the score needs to be the absolute value of the 
difference, and the modified score formula can be computed as: 
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𝑠⁡ = |𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑠. 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞| 
This formula is equal to the Manhattan distance formula. In the Manhattan distance 
formula, the distance between two points is the absolute difference of their cartesian 
coordinates and can be expressed as: 
𝑀𝑎𝑛ℎ𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑛⁡𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒⁡(𝑝, 𝑞) ⁡=∑ |⁡𝑝𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖 ⁡|
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Where p, and q are points in n-dimensional space. 
This shows that the Euclidean distance formula is logically reduced to the Manhattan 
distance formula in finding the K nearest vectors in VSM. Similarly, the score method of the 
Manhattan distance similarity in Lucene.NET can be implemented, as shown in Listing 14.  
public sealed class ManhattanDistanceSimilarity : SimilarityBase 
{ 
    public override float Score(BasicStats stats, float freq, float docLen) 
    { 
       return - Math.Abs(stats.TotalBoost - freq); 
    } 
 
    public override string ToString() 
    { 
        return "ManhattanDistanceSimilarity"; 
    } 
} 
Listing 14. Implementation of the Score method in Manhattan distance similarity. 
Although the Euclidean and Manhattan distance formulas are logically related in 
finding the nearest K vectors in VSM, they may produce different set of K nearest vectors. 
The best similarity algorithm is chosen by running and analyzing different experiments, which 
will be discussed later in the evaluation and optimization section. 
4.3.4 Custom Searcher 
In Lucene, searching involves query parsing, term boosting, scoring, and sorting. The 
custom searcher component uses a specific searching technique. In the customized searching 
chain, the input query is provided as a single line string that contains a list of feature-value 
tokens. Then each feature-value item is added to a Boolean query as a term query. Every 
feature of the query should be considered in the document matching. This can be enforced by 
setting the search occur property to Occur.MUST if necessary. The value of each feature is 
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added as a term boost in the query and is accessed in the similarity Score method. The 
searcher uses the custom similarity class specifically implemented for the nearest vector 
search. Every vector in the VSM is computed against the query vector, and the nearest K 
vectors are returned as a search result. Partial implementation of the customized searching 
chain is shown in Listing 15. Search performance optimization will be discussed later in the 
next chapter. 
public List<NeighborVector> Search(string featureData) 
{ 
    List<NeighborVector> nearestVectors = new List<NeighborVector>(); 
 
    string[] components = featureData.Split(','); 
    string[] features = components[0].Split(' '); 
        
    var query = new BooleanQuery(); 
 
    foreach (string featureValue in features) 
    { 
        string[] featureValueComponents = featureValue.Split('|'); 
        string feature = featureValueComponents[0]; 
        int value = Convert.ToInt32(featureValueComponents[1]); 
        if (value > 0) 
        { 
            var featureQuery = new TermQuery( 
                               new Term(EngineConstants.FEATURES_NAME, feature)); 
            featureQuery.Boost = value; 
            query.Add(featureQuery, Occur.SHOULD); 
        } 
    }     
 
    TopDocs topDocs = searcher.Search(query, K); 
     
    for (int i = 0; i < K; i++) 
    { 
        Document doc = searcher.Doc(topDocs.ScoreDocs[i].Doc); 
        string label = doc.Get(EngineConstants.LABEL_NAME).ToString(); 
        string description = doc.Get(EngineConstants.DESCRIPTION_NAME).ToString(); 
        nearestVectors.Add(new NeighborVector 
        { 
            Label = label, 
            Distance = Math.Abs(topDocs.ScoreDocs[i].Score), 
            Description = description 
        }); 
    }  
 
    return nearestVectors; 
} 
Listing 15. Partial implementation of Searcher returning K nearest vectors. 
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4.4 Binary Classifier Engine 
The proposed framework incorporates a machine learning-based binary classifier 
engine primarily used to train the search engine-based threat detection engine. The binary 
classifier engine is developed using the Microsoft ML.NET, as discussed in Chapter 3. The 
binary classifier engine also serves as reinforcement for the search engine-based classifier 
when its detection confidence is low. It has two major components: the model trainer and the 
predictor. 
4.4.1 Model Trainer 
The model trainer uses preprocessed data using the ML.NET data processor 
component discussed in Section 4.1. This section explains implementation of the model 
trainer component. The model trainer goes through three steps: first, the trainer creates a data 
reader and loads the input data into a DataView object. The feature values are processed as 
vectors, and the label is processed separately, as shown in Listing 1. After the data is loaded, 
in the second step, the model trainer goes through different algorithms such as normalization 
and classification algorithms. MinMaxNormalization algorithm is used to scale down the 
feature values based on observed minimum and maximum values of the data. FastTree 
classification algorithm is selected to train the model because FastTree is a decision tree-
based classification algorithm. The literature review in Chapter 2 shows that decision tree-
based algorithms outperform other algorithms in binary classification for intrusion detection. 
Parameter selection in the FastTree algorithm is a heuristic process. The initial values, such as 
the number of decision trees, leaves, and count per leaf, are set based on the prototype project 
discussed in Chapter 3. Further parametrization and optimization will be discussed in Chapter 
5. Finally, the trained model is saved as an archive file. As of this writing, FastTree trainer 
algorithm is not in the list of retrainable algorithms in ML.NET (Microsoft, 2019g). 
Therefore, a new model needs to be trained with the updated dataset when retraining the ML-
based binary classification engine is necessary. 
public static void Train() 
{ 
    var mlContext = new MLContext(); 
 
    // Load the data 
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    var reader = mlContext.Data.CreateTextLoader( 
        columns: new TextLoader.Column[] 
        { 
            new TextLoader.Column(EngineConstants.FEATURES_NAME,  
                                  DataKind.Single, 0, 
                                  EngineConstants.FEATURES_LAST_INDEX), 
            new TextLoader.Column(EngineConstants.LABEL_NAME,  
                                  DataKind.Boolean, 
                                  EngineConstants.LABEL_INDEX) 
        }, 
        separatorChar: EngineConstants.FEATURE_DATA_SEPARATOR, 
        hasHeader: false 
    ); 
    var trainingDataset = reader.Load(AppConfigSettings.MlTrainingDataPath); 
 
    //Train the Model 
    var pipeline = mlContext.Transforms 
                            .NormalizeMinMax(EngineConstants.FEATURES_NAME) 
                            .AppendCacheCheckpoint(mlContext) 
                            .Append(mlContext.BinaryClassification.Trainers 
                                     .FastTree(numberOfLeaves: 70, 
                                               numberOfTrees: 70, 
                                               minimumExampleCountPerLeaf: 20)); 
    var model = pipeline.Fit(trainingDataset); 
 
    //Save the model 
    using (var fileStream = new FileStream(AppConfigSettings.MLModelPath,  
                                           FileMode.Create, 
                                           FileAccess.Write, FileShare.Write)) 
    { 
        mlContext.Model.Save(model, trainingDataset.Schema, fileStream); 
    }    
} 
Listing 16. ML Model Trainer implementation. 
The accuracy and performance of the trained model is measured by running the model 
evaluator method against the test data, as implemented in Listing 17. The model evaluator 
loads the trained model that was created by the model trainer. Then for each input data the 
model trainer compares the prediction result with the original label value and populates the 
binary classification metrics object. The details of the evaluation metrics will be discussed 
later in Chapter 5.  
public static EvaluationMetrics Evaluate() 
{ 
    var mlContext = new MLContext(); 
 
    // Create data reader. 
    var reader = mlContext.Data.CreateTextLoader( 
        columns: new TextLoader.Column[] 
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        { 
            new TextLoader.Column(EngineConstants.FEATURES_NAME,  
                                  DataKind.Single, 0, 
                                  EngineConstants.FEATURES_LAST_INDEX), 
            new TextLoader.Column(EngineConstants.LABEL_NAME,  
                                  DataKind.Boolean, 
                                  EngineConstants.LABEL_INDEX) 
        }, 
        separatorChar: EngineConstants.FEATURE_DATA_SEPARATOR, 
        hasHeader: false 
    ); 
 
    DataViewSchema modelSchema; 
    var trainedModel = mlContext.Model.Load(AppConfigSettings.MLModelPath,  
                                            out modelSchema); 
 
    //Evaluate the Model 
    var testingDataset = reader.Load(AppConfigSettings.MlTestingDataPath); 
 
    IDataView predictions = trainedModel.Transform(testingDataset);   
 
    CalibratedBinaryClassificationMetrics metrics = mlContext 
                                         .BinaryClassification 
                                         .Evaluate(predictions,  
                                                   EngineConstants.LABEL_NAME);    
 
 
    //Test speed of the prediction engine 
    List<(string ActualValue, string PredictedValue)> evaluationResult =  
                              new List<(string, string)>(); 
    IEnumerable<string> testDataList = File.ReadAllLines( 
                                       AppConfigSettings.MlTestingDataPath); 
    int testDataCount = testDataList.Count(); 
 
    var watch = Stopwatch.StartNew(); 
 
    var predictor = ModelPredictor.Instance;           
 
    foreach (string dataLine in testDataList)           
    { 
        string[] components = dataLine.Split(','); 
        string features = string.Join(",", components.Take(components.Count()-1)); 
        string label = components.Last(); 
 
        FeatureData featureData = new FeatureData 
        { 
            MLFeaturesString = features, 
            Features = features.Split(EngineConstants.FEATURE_DATA_SEPARATOR) 
                               .Select(val => Convert.ToSingle(val)).ToArray(), 
            Label = label 
        }; 
        MLPrediction predictionResult = predictor.Predict(featureData); 
 
        string prediction = predictionResult.PredictedLabel? "1" : "0"; 
        evaluationResult.Add((label, prediction)); 
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    }            
 
    watch.Stop(); 
    double elapsedMs = watch.Elapsed.TotalMilliseconds / testDataCount; 
 
    EvaluationMetrics evaluationMetrics = MetricsCalcualtor 
                                          .Compute(evaluationResult); 
 
    evaluationMetrics.EngineName = "ML.NET"; 
    evaluationMetrics.AUC = metrics.AreaUnderRocCurve; 
    evaluationMetrics.AUPRC = metrics.AreaUnderPrecisionRecallCurve;            
    evaluationMetrics.DetectionSpeedPerSample = elapsedMs;            
 
    return evaluationMetrics; 
} 
Listing 17. Implementation of model evaluation. 
4.4.2 Predictor 
The predictor component of the binary classification engine is used to predict the 
status of the input traffic data. The predictor uses the trained model. The input traffic features 
data extracted from the FeatureExtractor are in a text format. The input data is converted to an 
input object called FeatureData. Instead of creating one property for each feature, all features 
are combined as a single float vector, as shown in Listing 18. This reduces the complexity of 
data conversion and makes the predictor model less dependent on the input data structure. 
public class FeatureData 
{    
    public string RawFeatureString { get; set; } 
    public string SEFeaturesString { get; set; } 
    public string MLFeaturesString { get; set; } 
    public string Label { get; set; } 
    public string Description { get; set; } 
 
    [LoadColumn(0, EngineConstants.FEATURES_LAST_INDEX)] 
    [VectorType(EngineConstants.FEATURES_LAST_INDEX + 1)] 
    public float[] Features { get; set; } 
} 
Listing 18. Feature Data class. 
The Predict method in the Predictor class accepts input traffic feature data as a string 
value. The feature data then converts to a FeatureData object and is passed to the prediction 
engine. Finally, the prediction engine returns the prediction result.  As shown in Listing 19, 
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the ModelPredictor class uses a thread-safe singleton3 pattern, which means no instance of 
this class is created in the application domain during prediction; only one instance of this class 
stays in the memory and performs prediction. The reason for this is to improve performance 
because reconstructing the prediction engine at every prediction slows down the detection 
process.  
public sealed class ModelPredictor : CoreMLEngine 
{ 
    private static PredictionEngine<FeatureData, MLPrediction> predictionEngine 
    private static volatile ModelPredictor instance; 
    private static readonly object syncLock = new object(); 
    private static readonly object threadLock = new object(); 
    private static MLContext mlContext; 
    private ModelPredictor() 
    { 
         mlContext = new MLContext(); 
        var trainedModel = mlContext.Model. 
            Load(AppConfigSettings.MLModelPath, out DataViewSchema modelSchema); 
        predictionEngine = mlContext.Model 
            .CreatePredictionEngine<FeatureData, MLPrediction>(trainedModel); 
    } 
    public static ModelPredictor Instance 
    { 
        get 
        { 
            if (instance == null) 
            { 
                lock (syncLock) 
                { 
                    if (instance == null) 
                        instance = new ModelPredictor(); 
                } 
            } 
            return instance; 
        } 
    }  
 
    public MLPrediction Predict(FeatureData featureData) 
    { 
        lock (threadLock) 
        {             
            return predictionEngine.Predict(featureData); 
        } 
    } 
} 
Listing 19. Implementation of ML Model Predictor. 
 
3 https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/msp-n-p/ff650316(v=pandp.10) 
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4.5 Decision Engine 
The decision engine serves as a dispatcher in the detection process. The decision 
engine first receives the input traffic data and sends it to the search engine searcher and 
collects the nearest matches. The decision engine applies the KNN algorithm on the returned 
search results to determine the status of the input traffic data. The decision engine also 
computes the confidence level of the prediction. When the confidence level is high, the 
prediction result becomes final. However, when the confidence level is low, the decision 
engine sends the input traffic data to the binary classifier engine, the binary classifier engine 
returns the final prediction, and the input traffic data is sent to the search engine for training. 
Therefore, the decision engine is responsible for continuously retraining the search engine, as 
discussed in Chapter 3 and shown in Figure 5’s activity diagram.  
4.5.1 Detection Engine 
The decision engine has a detection engine that runs several subprocesses such as 
detecting threats, sending alerts, and triggering retraining. Performance is critical for the 
detection engine, especially when analyzing live traffic. Therefore, the detection engine runs 
in a multithreaded context where operations run in parallel. In multithreaded contexts, 
multiple tasks can run asynchronously without blocking each other. The detection engine 
creates a detection process task for every input traffic. This task is separate from the main 
thread. This makes the detection engine concurrently run multiple detection process tasks. 
Each detection process task creates another threat detection task that is responsible for 
executing detection algorithms and returning prediction results. After the threat detector task 
completes, the returned prediction result passes to other child tasks such as alert sender task 
and search engine retrainer task; the child tasks run in parallel. The predictor and the searcher 
engines are developed to be thread-safe using a singleton design pattern to handle multiple 
threads at the same time. 
 
The .NET Framework supports multithreading and asynchronous programming and 
has several kinds of implementations. In .NET Framework there are three concepts of parallel 
programming: Thread, ThreadPool, and Task. Thread represents the low-level Operating 
System (OS) thread that allows programs the highest degree of control. ThreadPool is a 
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wrapper of a pool of Threads maintained by the Common Language Runtime (CLR), which 
can be used to execute Tasks, asynchronous activities, and process timers. Task provides the 
benefits of both Thread and ThreadPool. Task provides efficient and scalable use of system 
resources, provides better control, and has a rich set of APIs. In the .NET Framework, Task 
Parallel Library (TPL), which is based on the concept of Tasks and asynchronous operation, is 
the preferred API for multithreaded, asynchronous, and parallel programming (Microsoft, 
2017). Therefore, the decision engine is developed based on task-based asynchronous 
programming. The partial implementation of the detection engine component (the core of the 
decision engine) is shown in Listing 20.  
public static EngineName ACTIVE_DETECTION_ENGINE = EngineName.SEML; 
private static ConcurrentBag<Task> concurrentTasks = new ConcurrentBag<Task>(); 
public static ConcurrencyMethod CONCURRENCY_METHOD = ConcurrencyMethod.Ct; 
private static readonly object trainerThreadLock = new object(); 
 
public static async Task RunDetectionEngineWithCt() 
{    
    while (!STOP_ENGINE) 
    {                 
        if (concurrentTasks.Count > 0) 
        { 
            RUNNING = true;                   
            var firstFinishedTask = await Task.WhenAny(concurrentTasks);          
            concurrentTasks.TryTake(out firstFinishedTask); 
            await firstFinishedTask;                  
        } 
    }  
} 
public static void DetectWithCt(FeatureData featureData) 
{        
    if(!STOP_ENGINE) 
       concurrentTasks.Add(DetectTask(featureData)); 
}               
private static void Detect(FeatureData featureData) 
{ 
    DetectTask(featureData); 
} 
private static Task DetectTask(FeatureData featureData) 
{ 
    var threatDetectorTask = Task.Run(() => 
    { 
        //… Please see the implementation in Listing 21. 
    }); 
 
    return threatDetectorTask; 
} 
Listing 20. Partial implementation of the detection engine. 
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4.5.2 Decision Algorithms 
The decision engine uses two prediction models: the search engine and the ML engine. 
The search engine uses KNN as a primary classifier algorithm, and the ML binary classifier 
uses Fast Tree-based binary classifier algorithm. The prediction confidence of the search 
engine is computed as a percentage value of the number of the nearest vector labels that 
match the predicted label. When the confidence level is lower than a preset value, the feature 
data goes through the ML binary classifier. If the binary classifier returns different prediction 
results, the search engine is retrained. The value of the confidence level threshold determined 
by running different experiments will be discussed later in Chapter 5. Listing 21 shows the 
implementation of the detection method. 
private static Task DetectTask(FeatureData featureData) 
{ 
    var threatDetectorTask = Task.Run(() => 
    { 
        PredictionResult predictionResult = null; 
        var predictedLabel = string.Empty; 
        if (ACTIVE_DETECTION_ENGINE == EngineName.SE) 
           { 
               predictionResult = searcher.Predict(featureData.SEFeaturesString); 
               predictedLabel = predictionResult.Label; 
               predictionResult.EngineName = "SE"; 
           }   
        else if (ACTIVE_DETECTION_ENGINE == EngineName.SEML) 
        { 
            predictionResult = searcher.Predict(featureData.SEFeaturesString); 
            predictionResult.EngineName = "SE"; 
            predictedLabel = predictionResult.Label; 
            if (predictionResult.Confidence < GOOD_CONFIDENCE_PERCENTAGE) 
            { 
                var mlPrediction = mlPredictor.Predict(featureData); 
                predictedLabel = mlPrediction.PredictedLabel ? "1" : "0"; 
                if (predictionResult.Label != predictedLabel) 
                { 
                    predictionResult = mlPrediction; 
                    predictionResult.Confidence = mlPrediction.Probability * 100; 
                    predictionResult.EngineName = "ML";    
                    // … Call Retrainer.  
                    // Please see the implementation in Listing 
29.                
                } 
            } 
        } 
        else 
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        { 
            var mlPrediction = mlPredictor.Predict(featureData); 
            predictionResult = mlPrediction; 
            predictionResult.Confidence = mlPrediction.Probability * 100; 
            predictionResult.EngineName = "ML"; 
            predictedLabel = mlPrediction.PredictedLabel ? "1" : "0";             
        } 
 
        string[] components = featureData.RawFeatureString.Split(','); 
        predictionResult.SourceIp = components[0]; 
        predictionResult.SourcePort = components[1]; 
        predictionResult.DestinationIp = components[2]; 
        predictionResult.DestinationPort = components[3]; 
        predictionResult.Protocol = components[4]; 
        predictionResult.TimeStamp = DateTime.Now.ToString();  
        predictionResult.FlowDuration = components[5]; 
        predictionResult.TotalForwardPackets = components[6]; 
        predictionResult.TotalBackwardPackets = components[7]; 
        predictionResult.TotalForwardPacketsLength = components[8]; 
        predictionResult.TotalBackwardPacketsLength = components[9]; 
        predictionResult.Label = predictedLabel; 
 
        SendAlert(predictionResult); 
    }); 
 
    return threatDetectorTask; 
} 
Listing 21. Implementation of threat detection method. 
When the search engine retrainer method is called, the input feature data along with 
the prediction label is collected to retrain the search engine. The search engine retraining is 
processed by updating the search engine index. Unlike the ML binary classification model, 
the search engine can be trained without recreating the index. This is one benefit of the search 
engine model. However, the updated index is not available as soon as the index is updated 
because the searcher is implemented using the singleton pattern, which does not release 
previous indexes stored in the memory for performance reasons. This process will be 
discussed in detail later in Chapter 5 section 5.4.1 Continuous Training.   
4.6 Alert Service 
Although intrusion detection systems monitor network traffic for suspicious activities, 
they may not be capable of stopping the activity from further propagation. Usually intrusion 
detection systems issue alerts when potentially malicious activities or anomalies are detected 
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based on their configurations. Alerts could be in the form of emails, texts, log files, 
dashboards, etc.  
The alert service in the proposed framework is implemented by extending the log4net 
library. Log4net is a high-performance logging library developed based on the Apache log4j 
logging library, which has been in development since 1996. Log4net supports multiple 
logging targets such as the Windows console screen, trace pages, log files, Windows Event 
Log, Windows Messenger service, syslog service (Linux), email address (SMTP services), 
memory buffer, etc. (Apache Software Foundation, 2017). Log4net uses a configuration file 
to set up logging targets, formatting, and other settings. Listing 22 shows the initial setup of 
log4net, which reads settings from the log4net config file. The config file contains different 
logging targets and settings, which means the custom configured logger can send email and 
text messages, as well as trigger alerts to connected dashboards. 
public class AlertLogManager 
{ 
    private static readonly log4net.ILog log = log4net.LogManager 
                                              .GetLogger(typeof(AlertLogManager)); 
    private static bool isLoggerConfigured; 
    public static log4net.ILog Log 
    { 
        get 
        { 
            if (!isLoggerConfigured) 
            { 
                XmlDocument log4netConfig = new XmlDocument(); 
                log4netConfig.Load(File.OpenRead("log4net.config")); 
                var repository = log4net.LogManager 
                               .CreateRepository(Assembly.GetEntryAssembly(), 
                                typeof(log4net.Repository.Hierarchy.Hierarchy)); 
                log4net.Config.XmlConfigurator.Configure(repository, 
                                              log4netConfig["log4net"]); 
                isLoggerConfigured = true; 
            } 
            return log; 
        } 
    } 
} 
Listing 22. Log4net logger instance configuration. 
In the customized logger, when a threat is detected, the alert service writes the alert 
message in a log file and in a memory buffer through the log4net MemoryAppender 
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component. The log4net MemoryAppender class has been extended to handle a custom event 
when a new log message is added to the log, as shown in Listing 23.  
 
 public class AlertLogMemoryAppender : MemoryAppender 
 { 
     public event EventHandler LogUpdated; 
 
     protected override void Append(LoggingEvent loggingEvent) 
     {             
         base.Append(loggingEvent);             
         LogUpdated?.Invoke(this, new EventArgs()); 
     } 
 } 
Listing 23. Custom MemoryAppender implementation. 
There is a separate class called AlertLogWatcher that monitors the activity of the 
custom MemoryAppender class, called AlertLogMemoryAppender. This class intercepts the 
newly appended event by handling the custom LogUpdated event of the MemoryAppender 
class, as shown in Listing 24. 
public class AlertLogWatcher 
{ 
    private AlertLogMemoryAppender memoryAppender; 
    public event EventHandler LogUpdated; 
    public string LogContent { get; private set; } 
 
    public AlertLogWatcher() 
    {           
        memoryAppender = (AlertLogMemoryAppender)Array.Find( 
               AlertLogManager.Log.Logger.Repository.GetAppenders(), 
              (appender) => appender.Name.Equals("AlertLogMemoryAppender"));  
         
        LogContent = GetEvents(memoryAppender);             
        memoryAppender.LogUpdated += HandleLogUpdate; 
    } 
 
    public void HandleLogUpdate(object sender, EventArgs e) 
    { 
        LogContent = GetEvents(memoryAppender); 
        LogUpdated?.Invoke(this, new EventArgs()); 
    }        
 
    public string GetEvents(AlertLogMemoryAppender memoryAppender) 
    { 
        StringBuilder output = new StringBuilder();            
        LoggingEvent[] logEvents = memoryAppender.GetEvents();            
        if (logEvents != null && logEvents.Length > 0) 
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        {                 
            memoryAppender.Clear();                
            foreach (LoggingEvent ev in logEvents) 
            {                 
                output.Append(ev.RenderedMessage); 
            } 
        }           
        return output.ToString(); 
    } 
} 
Listing 24. Implementation of AlertLogWatcher class. 
The main purpose of the AlertLogWatcher class is to expose the newly added event to 
external services, such as the monitoring application and dashboards. By using the 
AlertLogWatcher class, external services are notified in real time when a new log event is 
triggered. This will be discussed in the next section. 
4.7 Monitor Application 
To block detected malicious activities, automated systems such as Intrusion 
Prevention Systems (IPS) or manual activities may be required. Discussing IPS is beyond the 
scope of this research; however, in order to demonstrate the validity of the proposed 
framework, a simple monitor application that shows the detection activities and provides 
control services has been developed. The monitor application is developed using Web 
technologies such as JavaScript, HTML, and CSS so that it can be remotely accessed through 
HTTP on different platforms such as Desktops, Tablets, and Mobile devices.  
The monitor application uses WebSocket technology for real-time communication 
with the detection engine. According to the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF, 2011), 
WebSocket is a protocol that enables two-way communication channels over TCP 
connections that do not rely on opening multiple HTTP connections. WebSocket technology 
is used in real-time communication apps such as chat, dashboard, and stock ticker apps. In 
.NET Framework, WebSocket can be implemented using different libraries such as SignalR. 
The ASP.NET Core SignalR is an opensource library that supports WebSocket as a real-time 
web functionality to applications. SignalR applies “server push” functionality using Remote 
Procedure Calls (RPC) rather than the request-response model. SignalIR uses a high-level 
pipeline called a hub, which allows method calls between the client and server 
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communication. WebSocket is fully supported in Microsoft Internet Explorer, Google 
Chrome, and Mozilla Firefox and partially supported in Opera and Safari. When the client 
browser does not support WebSocket, SignalR falls back to other transports such as Server-
Sent Events, ForeverFrame, and Ajax Long Polling (Microsoft, 2014, 2018). 
The monitor application is an ASP.NET Core application. The application serves as a 
dashboard and a control board to the threat detection system. The application can send 
commands such as to restart and stop services and enables the system administrators to 
control the entire detection system using browsers.  A high-level process flow diagram of the 
monitor application is shown in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10. Process flow diagram of the monitor application. 
The service hub class in the ASP.NET Core application has an instance of the 
AlertLogWatcher class, as shown in Listing 25. When an alert is triggered, the 
AlertLogWatcher_Updated method sends the alert message to all connected clients of the 
monitor application by invoking their ReceiveAlert function. 
public class ServiceHub : Hub 
{ 
    private AlertLogWatcher alertLogWatcher; 
    protected IHubContext<ServiceHub> _context; 
    public ServiceHub(IHubContext<ServiceHub> context) 
    { 
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        if(alertLogWatcher == null) 
        { 
            alertLogWatcher = new AlertLogWatcher(); 
            alertLogWatcher.LogUpdated += AlertLogWatcher_Updated; 
            EngineService.StartDetectionEngineLiveTraffic( 
                        activeDetectionEngine: EngineName.SEML); 
            //EngineService.StartDetectionEngineSimulation(); 
        } 
        _context = context; 
         
    } 
 
    private async void AlertLogWatcher_Updated(object sender, EventArgs e) 
    { 
        var connectedClients = Startup.hubContext.Clients; 
        if (connectedClients != null) 
        { 
            string msg = alertLogWatcher.LogContent; 
            await connectedClients.All.SendAsync("ReceiveAlert", msg); 
        } 
    }        
} 
Listing 25. Partial implementation of SignalR Service Hub. 
In this context, clients are user browsers. The monitor application can be hosted in a 
web server, so that clients can access it through a URL. On the first page load event, the 
connected client makes a call to the service hub through the hub URL. Once the connection is 
established, the client can send messages to, and receive messages from, the server in real 
time through the JavaScript SignalR component, as shown in Listing 26. 
$(document).ready(function () { 
    adjustResultLayout(); 
 
    var connection = new signalR.HubConnectionBuilder() 
        .withUrl("/service-hub").build(); 
 
    connection.on("ReceiveAlert", function (alert) { 
        displayAlert(alert); 
    }); 
 
    connection.start().then(function () { 
    }).catch(function (err) { 
        return console.error(err.toString()); 
    }); 
     
}); 
Listing 26. Partial implementation of client-side service. 
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4.8 Summary 
This chapter discussed implementation of algorithms and components for the proposed 
cyber threat detection framework. The main components of the framework are the data 
processor, the two core detection engines—the search engine and ML engine—the decision 
engine, alert service, and monitor application. Each component is designed and developed to 
be loosely coupled to one another. The search engine customization involved the introduction 
of new similarity algorithms and the customization of default components of Lucene such as 
Analyzers, Tokenizers, and the Indexing process chain. Implementation of the ML.NET-
based binary classifier engine is easier than the search engine customization. The decision 
engine is multithreaded to speed up the detection process. When an attack is detected, the alert 
service records the event in a multitargeted logger service. The detection system has a monitor 
application subscribed to the logger service to watch alerts. If alerts are pushed, the monitor 
application notifies connected clients in real time. The real-time communication of the client 
and server is implemented using WebSocket and SignalR library. In the next chapter we will 
discuss the evaluation, optimization approaches, and validation of the developed framework.    
This concludes Chapter 4. System Development. This chapter discussed 
implementation of the new framework and its components as designed in Chapter 3. This 
chapter involved mathematical analysis and the development of algorithms and components. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CASE STUDY 
Chapter 4 provided implementation of the core framework and its components. Each 
component was tested for its basic functionality during development. This chapter discusses 
several additional test cases such as performance, detection accuracy, scalability, load testing, 
and overall system validation. Setting up evaluation metrics, optimizing techniques, empirical 
analysis and performance results of the framework are also discussed in this chapter. 
5.1. Initial Evaluation 
According to Microsoft documentation (Microsoft, 2019e), metrics for the binary 
classification model include accuracy, precision, recall, Area Under the Curve (AUC), Area 
Under the Curve of a Precision Recall Curve (AUCPR), and F1-Score. In general, the 
performance of an IDS is evaluated in terms of detection accuracy and rate. Detection 
accuracy can be further analyzed by positive prediction and negative prediction rates based on 
the context of the problem. 
5.1.1. Evaluation Metrics 
Definition: In the context of this model evaluation, an attack instance is treated as a 
positive class, and a benign instance is treated as a negative class.  
True Positive (TP): A prediction outcome where the model correctly predicts the 
positive class (attack class). It is a measure of positive (attack) instances detected accurately. 
False Positive (FP): A prediction outcome where the model incorrectly predicts the 
positive class. It is a measure of negative (benign) instances detected as positive (attack). 
True Negative (TN): A prediction outcome where the model correctly predicts the 
negative class (benign class). It is the measure of negative (benign) instances detected 
accurately. 
False Negative (FN): A prediction outcome where the model incorrectly predicts the 
negative class. It is a measure of positive (attack) instances detected as negative (benign). 
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Accuracy (ACC): The percentage of total number of instances correctly classified. It 
is the proportion of the predictions of the model got right. The closer the accuracy is to 100% 
the better. A 100% accuracy, however, could indicate issues such as label leakage, model 
overfitting, or testing with the training data. An unbalanced or very small amount of test data 
could make the accuracy approach the extremes of 0 or 100% (Microsoft, 2019e). 
𝐴𝐶𝐶 =
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
 
Precision (Pr): The proportion of correctly predicted positive (attack) classes to the 
total number of instances predicted as positive (attack). 
𝑃𝑟 =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃
 
Recall (Rc): The proportion of actual positives (attacks) predicted correctly to the 
total number of correctly predicted positives or incorrectly predicted negatives. Recall is also 
called the True Positive Rate (TPR). 
𝑇𝑃𝑅 =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
 
False Positive Rate (FPR): The measure of the proportion of negative (benign) 
instances that are correctly predicted. 
𝐹𝑃𝑅 =
𝐹𝑃
𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
 
F1-Score (F1): The harmonic mean of the Precision and Recall. It indicates the 
balance between the Precision and Recall. 
𝐹1 =
2 ∗ 𝑇𝑃𝑅 ∗ 𝑃𝑟
𝑃𝑟 + 𝑇𝑃𝑅
 
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curve: A graph that shows the 
performance of a binary classification model at all classification thresholds. Figure 11 shows 
the ROC curve. It plots the TPR or Recall versus FPR. As the ROC indicates, lowering the 
classification threshold makes the model classify more positives. 
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Figure 11. ROC curve. 
Area Under the ROC Curve (AUC): The measure of the area under the curve 
created by sweeping the True Positive Rate or Recall and the False Positive Rate. For 
acceptable models, AUC should be greater than 0.50. The closer the AUC is to 1.0, the better.  
If we let x be FPR and TPR be f(x), the area of the region under the curve can be 
calculated as the integral of f(x) by dx. 
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 = ∫ 𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
1
0
 
⇒ 𝐴𝑈𝐶⁡ = ∫ 𝑇𝑃𝑅(𝐹𝑃𝑅)𝑑(𝑇𝑃𝑅)
1
0
 
The ML.NET documentation defines AUC as the probability that the binary classifier 
ranks a randomly chosen positive instance higher than a randomly chosen negative instance, 
and that AUC has been implemented accordingly in the ML.NET source code.4 
Area Under the Curve of Precision Recall Curve (AUCPR): The measure of the 
success of prediction when the classes are very imbalanced. An AUCPR value closer to 1.00 
 
4 https://github.com/dotnet/machinelearning/blob/610ffcb67083c2e5e6e1a14884ba24b1da0384c7/ 
src/Microsoft.ML.Data/Evaluators/BinaryClassifierEvaluator.cs 
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shows that the binary classifier is returning high-precision accurate results, as well as 
returning the majority of all positive results (high recall).  
Average Detection Speed Per Sample: The average time the prediction engine takes 
to predict the class of a single instance. Speed depends on several factors such as the testing 
computer performance and its configurations.  
𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙⁡𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠
 
Implementation of algebraic metrics for both the search engine and binary classifier 
engine are shown in Listing 27. 
public class MetricsCalcualtor 
{ 
    public static EvaluationMetrics Compute(IEnumerable<(string ActualValue,  
                                    string PredictedValue)> evaluationResult) 
    {            
        double tp = evaluationResult.Where(item => (item.PredictedValue == "1")  
                                           && item.ActualValue == "1").Count(); 
        double fp = evaluationResult.Where(item => (item.PredictedValue == "1")  
                                           && item.ActualValue == "0").Count(); 
        double tn = evaluationResult.Where(item => (item.PredictedValue == "0")  
                                           && item.ActualValue == "0").Count(); 
        double fn = evaluationResult.Where(item => (item.PredictedValue == "0")  
                                           && item.ActualValue == "1").Count(); 
 
        double acc = (tp + tn) / (tp + tn + fp + fn); 
        double pr = tp / (tp + fp); 
        double tpr = tp / (tp + fn); 
        double fpr = fp / (fp + tn); 
        double f1Score = (2 * tpr * pr) / (pr + tpr); 
 
        EvaluationMetrics metrics = new EvaluationMetrics 
        { 
            Accuracy = acc, 
            Precision = pr, 
            TPR = tpr, 
            FPR = fpr, 
            F1Score = f1Score                  
        }; 
 
        return metrics; 
    } 
} 
Listing 27. Implementation of evaluation metrics. 
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5.1.2. Model Evaluation 
For the initial evaluation, both the search engine and the ML binary classification 
models are trained with the same dataset. A total of 129,924 training instances and 55,253 
testing instances, which is one third of the training instances, are used for building and 
evaluating the models. The datasets contain different kinds of network attacks such as 
DoS/DDoS, brute force Cross Site Scripting (XSS), SQL injection, port scan, infiltration, and 
FTP/SSH patator.5 The class balance for both the training and testing datasets is one to one, 
which means the number of attack and benign instances are equal in each dataset. Initial 
parameters of the selected algorithms to train the initial models are shown in Table 7. These 
parameters are set based on the prototype project and theoretical assumptions. 
 
Table 7. Initial Model Parameters 
Model Algorithms and Parameters 
Search Engine Classification Algorithm  KNN 
 Similarity Algorithm Squared Euclidean Distance 
 Number of Neighbors (K) 69 
 Vector Dimension Fixed 
ML.NET Classification Algorithm FastTree (Decision Tree) 
 Number of Trees 50 
 Number of Leaves 50 
 Sample Count Per Leaf 20 
 
Table 8 shows the initial model evaluation result before applying any optimization. A 
Windows 10 developer workstation with 16GB RAM and 3.1GHz processor speed was used 
in this evaluation. The detection time per instance is the amount of time spent in milliseconds 
to process a single traffic instance in a synchronous operation. Unlike the other evaluation 
metrics, the detection time changes at every test run. The listed detection speed is the average 
value. 
 
5 Patator is a Python script used to make multiple brute force attacks. https://en.kali.tools/?p=147  
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Table 8. Initial Evaluation of Classification Models 
Metrics Detection Models 
Search Engine ML.NET 
Accuracy 0.86 0.89 
Precision 0.91 0.89  
True Positive Rate (Recall) 0.81 0.87 
False Positive Rate (FPR) 0.09 0.10 
F1 Score 0.86 0.88 
Detection Time Per Instance (ms) 531.52 145.68 
 
The initial evaluation result shows that the search engine is slower than the ML.NET 
model. As the search engine is using VSM, this is expected because each vector in the VSM 
needs to be visited to compute distances from the input vector. Detection accuracy and speed 
can be improved by applying different optimization techniques, which will be discussed in the 
next section. 
5.2. Optimization 
The search engine uses the VSM model and KNN algorithm for binary classification. 
The time complexity (big O notation) O of the model to detect a single instance of traffic can 
be expressed as:  
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝑂(𝑛 ∗ 𝑓) ⁡⇒ 𝑂(𝑛) 
Where n is the number of training instances (number of vectors in the VSM), and f is 
the number of features of each instance.   
The time complexity of the VSM model can be optimized by either reducing the 
number of visited vectors n or reducing the number of less important features f. 
5.2.1 Feature Reduction 
Feature reduction is a process of selecting the most important features by excluding 
the less important features. Feature reduction reduces noise and training time, increasing the 
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performance of the model. In machine learning, the internals of feature processing are less 
clear, and the models are often considered black boxes. The most important features can be 
selected by randomly shuffling data and calculating the delta on the performance metrics; the 
larger the delta is, the more the important the feature (Breiman, 2001). ML.NET classification 
and regression models provide feature details such as feature weight and change in metrics 
using Permutation Feature Importance (PFI) technique (Microsoft, 2019f). For the binary 
classification model, PFI computes all possible classification evaluation metrics for each 
feature by running a given number of iterations called the permutation count.  
The PFI runs after training the first model. To obtain the importance of each feature, 
thirty permutations have been performed and each evaluation metric was collected as shown 
in the implementation Listing 28. Then the result was ordered by change in performance.  
public static List<string> ComputePermutationFeatureImportance() 
{ 
    var mlContext = new MLContext(); 
 
    // Load the data 
    var reader = mlContext.Data.CreateTextLoader( 
        columns: new TextLoader.Column[] 
        { 
            new TextLoader.Column(EngineConstants.FEATURES_NAME,  
                                  DataKind.Single, 0, 
                                  EngineConstants.FEATURES_LAST_INDEX), 
            new TextLoader.Column(EngineConstants.LABEL_NAME,  
                                  DataKind.Boolean, 
                                  EngineConstants.LABEL_INDEX) 
        }, 
        separatorChar: EngineConstants.FEATURE_DATA_SEPARATOR, 
        hasHeader: false 
    ); 
    var trainingDataset = reader.Load(AppConfigSettings.MlTrainingDataPath); 
 
    //Train the Model 
    var pipeline = mlContext.Transforms.NormalizeMinMax( 
                                        EngineConstants.FEATURES_NAME) 
                            .AppendCacheCheckpoint(mlContext) 
                            .Append(mlContext.BinaryClassification.Trainers 
                                    .FastTree(numberOfLeaves: 50, 
                                          numberOfTrees: 50, 
                                          minimumExampleCountPerLeaf: 20)); 
    var model = pipeline.Fit(trainingDataset); 
               
    var transformedData = model.Transform(trainingDataset); 
    var linearPredictor = model.LastTransformer; 
    
    var permutationMetrics = mlContext.BinaryClassification 
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        .PermutationFeatureImportance(linearPredictor, transformedData, 
        permutationCount: 30); 
     
    var featureDetails = permutationMetrics.Select((metrics, index) => new 
        { 
            Index = index, 
            AUC = metrics.AreaUnderRocCurve, 
            metrics.Accuracy, 
            metrics.F1Score, 
            Precision = metrics.PositivePrecision, 
            TPR = metrics.PositiveRecall, 
            FPR = metrics.NegativeRecall 
        }).OrderByDescending(feature => Math.Abs(feature.AUC.Mean)) 
          .ThenByDescending(feature => Math.Abs(feature.Accuracy.Mean)) 
          .ThenByDescending(feature => Math.Abs(feature.F1Score.Mean)) 
          .ThenByDescending(feature => Math.Abs(feature.Precision.Mean)) 
          .ThenByDescending(feature => Math.Abs(feature.TPR.Mean)) 
          .ThenByDescending(feature => Math.Abs(feature.FPR.Mean)); 
 
    string featureDetailsString = "Feature\tWeight\tAUC\tAccuracy\tF1Score" + 
                                  "\tPrecison\tTPR\tFPR\tAUC-Confidence"; 
    List<string> featuresDetailList = new List<string>(); 
    featuresDetailList.Add(featureDetailsString); 
    Console.WriteLine(featureDetailsString); 
 
    VBuffer<float> featureWeights = new VBuffer<float>(); 
    linearPredictor.Model.SubModel.GetFeatureWeights(ref featureWeights); 
    foreach (var fd in featureDetails) 
    { 
        string detailsString = string.Format("{0}\t{1:0.00}\t{2:G4}\t{3:G4}" + 
            "\t{4:G4}\t{5:G4}\t{6:G4}\t{7:G4}\t{8:G4}", 
             fd.Index, 
             featureWeights.GetValues()[fd.Index], 
             Math.Abs(fd.AUC.Mean), 
             Math.Abs(fd.Accuracy.Mean), 
             Math.Abs(fd.F1Score.Mean), 
             Math.Abs(fd.Precision.Mean), 
             Math.Abs(fd.TPR.Mean), 
             Math.Abs(fd.FPR.Mean), 
             1.96 * fd.AUC.StandardError); 
        featuresDetailList.Add(detailsString); 
        Console.WriteLine(detailsString);                 
    } 
    File.WriteAllLines(AppConfigSettings.FeaturesImportancePath,  
                        featuresDetailList); 
    return featuresDetailList; 
} 
Listing 28. Partial implementation of Permutation Feature Importance (PFI). 
There is a total of 78 features used in each instance of the initial training dataset. 
These features were generated from PCAP files using CICFlowMeter. Although 
CICFlowMeter generates over 80 features, the PFI result shows that eighteen features have no 
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impact on any of the evaluation metrics. The complete result of features and importance 
metrics is listed in Appendix B: List of Features. The eighteen least important features have 
been removed from the dataset, and the models are retrained with the remaining 60 features. 
The evaluation result in Table 9 clearly shows that accuracy was not reduced because the 
removed features are not important. As a result of feature reduction, the search engine 
detection time was improved by 186 milliseconds on average per detection, and the overall 
performance of ML.NET model was also improved. 
Table 9. Model Evaluation Metrics Using Important Features 
Metrics Detection Models 
Search Engine ML.NET 
Accuracy 0.86 0.92 
Precision 0.91 0.96  
True Positive Rate (Recall) 0.81 0.87 
False Positive Rate (FPR) 0.09 0.04 
F1 Score 0.86 0.91 
Detection Time Per Instance (ms) 345.08 117.70 
 
5.2.2 Euclidean Distance versus Manhattan Distance 
In Chapter 4, we discussed similarity algorithms, so we have seen that the square of 
Euclidean distance can be logically reduced to Manhattan distance in searching for nearest 
neighbors. This means that both the squared Euclidean distance and the Manhattan distance 
formulas yield the same set of nearest vectors in Lucene VSM because the square and the 
square root functions are monotonically increasing functions on real numbers greater or equal 
to one. In this section we will verify the logic by comparing the performance difference 
between the two similarity algorithms as shown in Table 10.  
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Table 10. Euclidean Distance versus Manhattan Distance 
Metrics Search Engine Model Algorithms 
Euclidean Distance Manhattan Distance 
Accuracy 0.86 0.86 
Precision 0.91 0.91  
True Positive Rate (Recall) 0.81 0.81 
False Positive Rate (FPR) 0.09 0.09 
F1 Score 0.86 0.86 
Detection Time Per Instance (ms) 345.08 336.19 
 Both the Euclidean distance and the Manhattan distance similarities yielded the same 
set of nearest vectors and detection performance except the Manhattan distance is little faster 
than the Euclidean distance. This result verifies that using the square of Euclidean distance 
and Manhattan distance in Lucene VSM yields the same accuracy in the KNN algorithm. 
5.2.3 Changing the Number of Nearest Vectors in KNN Algorithm 
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, the KNN algorithm depends on the number of 
nearest neighbors K. Varying the value of K impacts the performance, and finding the optimal 
value of K is a heuristic process. Usually the simple approach to choose the value of K for 
binary classification is to take an odd integer closer to the square root of the total training 
dataset (Chio & Freeman, 2018). Table 11 shows the accuracy variation of ten randomly 
chosen values of 𝐾⁡ ∈ [3, √𝑛]; where √𝑛 ⁡≅ 359. The initial value of K was 69; changing K to 
29 slightly improves the performance because it reduces the number of nearest vectors, and 
there is no performance difference when switching between these values. 
Table 11. Number of Nearest Vectors versus Accuracy 
K 3 9 19 29 43 69 89 119 229 359 
Accuracy (%) 85 83 84 86 86 86 85 82 82 83 
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5.2.4 Variable Vector Dimension 
In the initial training, all features with zero values were boosted to 1 to keep all the 
stored vectors at the same dimension. Documents in the search engine can have variable term 
lengths, so the corresponding term-frequency vectors can have variable dimensions. The 
training data has 60 features, but all these features may not have non-zero values all the time.  
In this process the search engine model was retrained by excluding the zero values, which 
creates vectors with variable dimensions in Lucene VSM. This improved both the detection 
accuracy and the speed, as shown in Table 12. The training used Manhattan distance 
similarity and 29 nearest vectors (K=29). 
Table 12. Performance of Variable versus Fixed Dimension Vectors 
Metrics VSM Vector Dimension 
Variable Dimension Fixed Dimension 
Accuracy 0.89 0.86 
Precision 0.93 0.91  
True Positive Rate (Recall) 0.84 0.81 
False Positive Rate (FPR) 0.06 0.09 
F1 Score 0.88 0.86 
Detection Time Per Instance (ms) 195.83 336.19 
 
5.2.5 ML.NET Binary Classifier Optimization 
The ML.NET binary classifier engine uses FastTree algorithm, which is a decision 
tree-based algorithm. This algorithm takes three parameters: the number of trees, leaves, and 
sample counts per leaf. Changing these parameters yields different metrics. The data 
normalization algorithm also impacts the accuracy of the model. After running several 
combinations of the parameter values and normalization algorithms, using the min-max 
normalization algorithm and setting the number of decision trees to 70 with 70 leaves per tree 
and 20 minimum sample count per leaf yielded the optimal result, as shown in Table 13. 
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Table 13. Optimized ML.NET Binary Classifier Model 
Metrics Value 
Accuracy 0.92 
Precision 0.95 
True Positive Rate (Recall) 0.87 
False Positive Rate (FPR) 0.04 
F1 Score 0.91 
AUC 0.98 
AUCPR 0.97 
Detection Time Per Instance (ms) 117.70 
5.2.6 Class Balancing 
The model training so far used equally partitioned numbers of attack and benign 
instances. In real cases, most traffic instances in a network are not attacks. With this logic in 
mind, we increased the number of benign instances by one third in the training dataset without 
changing the number of attack instances. This made the attack-benign ratio 2:3. The new 
model result shows improvement on the detection accuracy, precision, and FPR. However, 
both models were slightly reduced in F1Score, TPR, and detection speed (for the search 
engine), as shown in Table 14. 
Table 14. Detection Performance with 2:3 Attack-Benign Ratio Training Dataset 
Metrics Detection Models 
Search Engine ML.NET 
Accuracy 0.92 0.94 
Precision 0.96 0.97  
True Positive Rate (Recall) 0.80 0.84 
False Positive Rate (FPR) 0.02 0.02 
F1 Score 0.87 0.90 
Detection Time Per Instance (ms) 275.95 117.70 
85 
 
5.3 Final Evaluation 
Algorithm selection and parameter optimization depend on the type of the dataset used 
for training and testing. Table 15 shows the optimized parameters and algorithms for each 
detection model. Table 16 also shows the final evaluation results of the models.  
Table 15. Optimized Model Parameters 
Model Algorithms and Parameters 
Search Engine Classification Algorithm KNN 
 Similarity Algorithm Manhattan Distance 
 Number of Neighbors (K) 29 
ML.NET Classification Algorithm FastTree (Decision Tree) 
 Number of Trees 70 
 Number of Leaves 70 
 Sample Count Per Leaf 30 
 
Table 16. Final Model Evaluation Result 
Metrics Detection Models 
Search Engine ML.NET 
Accuracy 0.92 0.94 
Precision 0.96 0.97  
True Positive Rate (Recall) 0.80 0.84 
False Positive Rate (FPR) 0.02 0.02 
F1 Score 0.87 0.90 
Detection Time Per Instance (ms) 275.95 117.70 
 
The evaluation and optimization techniques used so far show that the models can be 
further tuned up by changing techniques and parameter values based on business 
requirements. One technique or parameter may not improve all the metrics in all instances. 
For example, class unbalancing improves accuracy and precision but reduces the TPR and F1 
Score. Although the overall detection accuracy of the search engine and the ML.NET are 
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closer to each other, ML.NET is faster than the search engine when processing a single traffic 
instance in a synchronous operation. However, the detection engine runs asynchronously, 
which means that several detection operations can run in parallel without blocking each other. 
A new traffic instance runs into the detection engine as soon as it arrives, without waiting for 
the previous instance to complete. When running the engine with asynchronous parallel tasks, 
the search engine takes an average of 87 milliseconds to process a single traffic instance, 
whereas ML.NET takes 0.03 milliseconds. 
5.4 System Testing 
The threat detection framework incorporates components such as a data processor, 
detection engine, alert service, and dashboard application. In this section, system testing 
addresses the integration of these components in a complete system environment in different 
scenarios. Since feature extraction is beyond the scope of this research, a prelabeled flood of 
traffic instances was used to simulate high volume network traffic. About 10,000 traffic 
instances continuously passed to a running detection engine using a loop code. The detection 
engine uses the search engine as the primary detection, and the ML engine backs it up when 
the search engine detection confidence is low. Figure 12 shows the dashboard application 
with the detection results. Unlike the ML engine, the search engine can predict the details of 
the attack such as the type of the attack. The description column shows the probability of the 
attacks by type. For instance, as shown in Figure 12, the expanded description cell shows the 
probability of possible attack types, which means out of selected K nearest vectors, 17% of 
the vectors are labeled benign, and the remaining 83% are labeled as attacks. Out of 83% of 
attack labeled vectors, 87.5% are labeled as DOS Slowloris, 8.3% are labeled as FTP Patator, 
and 4.2% are labeled as port scan. 
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Figure 12. Detection framework dashboard. 
5.4.1 Continuous Training 
As previously discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, when search engine detection confidence 
is below some configurable value, the ML engine takes the prediction task and the search 
engine learns the incident. In this research, the default confidence value is set to be 95, which 
means a prediction score of less than 95% is considered low. When the detection confidence 
of the search engine is low, the decision engine uses the ML model to process the traffic 
feature. If the ML model predicts a different result than the search engine does, the decision 
engine takes the prediction result of the ML model, and the search engine learns the incident 
in a separate task, as shown in Listing 29.  
During the retraining process, the input traffic data has the result predicted from the 
ML model as a label. The search engine model gets updated with the new training data. This 
changes the future prediction for similar traffic data because the nearest vectors set may 
include the newly added vector. Therefore, continuous training makes the search engine grow 
smarter as it increases the search engine prediction confidence. 
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private static Task DetectTask(FeatureData featureData) 
{ 
    var threatDetectorTask = Task.Run(() => 
    { 
        PredictionResult predictionResult = null; 
        var predictedLabel = string.Empty; 
        if (ACTIVE_DETECTION_ENGINE == EngineName.SE) 
            { 
               //… 
            }    
     else if (ACTIVE_DETECTION_ENGINE == EngineName.SEML) 
        { 
            predictionResult = searcher.Predict(featureData.SEFeaturesString); 
            predictionResult.EngineName = "SE"; 
            predictedLabel = predictionResult.Label; 
            if (predictionResult.Confidence < GOOD_CONFIDENCE_PERCENTAGE) 
            { 
                var mlPrediction = mlPredictor.Predict(featureData); 
                predictedLabel = mlPrediction.PredictedLabel ? "1" : "0"; 
                if (predictionResult.Label != predictedLabel) 
                { 
                    predictionResult = mlPrediction; 
                    predictionResult.Confidence = mlPrediction.Probability * 100; 
                    predictionResult.EngineName = "ML"; 
 
                    var searchEngineRetrainerTask = Task.Factory.StartNew(() => 
                           { 
                               ReTrainSearchEngine(featureData.SEFeaturesString,  
                                   predictedLabel); 
                           }); 
                } 
            } 
        } 
        else 
        { 
            var mlPrediction = mlPredictor.Predict(featureData); 
            predictionResult = mlPrediction; 
            predictionResult.Confidence = mlPrediction.Probability * 100; 
            predictionResult.EngineName = "ML"; 
            predictedLabel = mlPrediction.PredictedLabel ? "1" : "0"; 
        } 
 
        //… 
 
        SendAlert(predictionResult); 
    }); 
 
    return threatDetectorTask; 
} 
Listing 29. Partial implementation of threat detection task. 
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The searcher component of the search engine is managed in a singleton instance. After 
the retraining task is completed, the singleton instance should be updated to include the newly 
trained model. Starting the searcher component takes a few seconds on average. To mitigate 
this issue, when the retraining task starts, the decision engine uses the ML engine until the 
training is complete and the model is refreshed, as shown in Listing 30. 
private static void ReTrainSearchEngine(string seFeatureString,  
                                        string predictedLabel) 
{         
    lock (trainerThreadLock) 
    {                
        ACTIVE_DETECTION_ENGINE = EngineName.ML;  
 
        string labelDescription = "benign"; 
        if (predictedLabel == "1") 
            labelDescription = "attack"; //ML BC cannot predict the attack type 
        string featureData = seFeatureString + "," + predictedLabel + "|" +  
                             labelDescription; 
        var indexer = new Indexer(); 
        indexer.UpdateIndex(featureData); 
        
        Searcher.ResetInstance(); 
        searcher = Searcher.Instance; //restart searcher 
       
        ACTIVE_DETECTION_ENGINE = EngineName.SEML; 
    } 
} 
Listing 30. Implementation of search engine retraining. 
5.4.2 Enterprise Scale Testing 
In this section we will discuss the performance of the detection engine with respect to 
enterprise testing metrics. Table 17 shows the Visual Studio diagnostic tools results, such as 
CPU, memory usage, and system stability, while the detection engine is processing 
approximately 10,000 simulated flood of traffic instances being passed to the detection engine 
at a time.  
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Table 17. Load Testing Performance Comparison Table 
Search Engine ML.NET 
 
 
Detection Time Per Instance: 87ms Detection Time Per Instance: 0.03ms 
Exceptions: 0 Exceptions: 0 
Crashes: 0 Crashes: 0 
 
Load Testing: As the performance comparison table shows, the search engine 
consumes more resources than the ML engine. The search engine consumes up to all the 
available CPU power while processing the flood of traffic instances. This implies that the 
search engine-based detection is CPU intensive and requires more CPU resources for high 
volume traffic detection. Testing the search engine detection on a different machine (Intel 
Xeon CPU E5-2430 v2 2.5Ghz) reduced the average single instance detection time from 87ms 
to 70ms. This indicates that increasing the CPU power increases the performance of the 
search engine. 
Stability: The detection framework uses the popular logger log4net for logging and 
alerting services. Any exception during the detection can be logged. The logger can also be 
further configured for notification. During the testing session, both engines completed without 
a failure or exception. The detection engine has a restart option in case of crash recovery.  
 Extensibility: As the detection engine is based on a search engine library, it can be 
trained to function as a text classifier such as a spam detector. By extending the data 
processor, indexer, and searcher components of the engine based on the input data, a new 
detection model can be generated without further customizing the internals of the search 
engine.  
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Portability: The whole framework and its components are developed using Microsoft 
.NET Core framework. The .NET Core framework is a multiplatform framework that supports 
Windows, Linux, and macOS operating systems. For instance, Figure 13 shows the publish 
settings of the framework project to target multiple platforms. The detection framework has 
been designed and developed to run on these platforms but tested only on Windows.  
 
Figure 13. Project publish settings. 
Deployment: The new cyber threat detection framework was deployed as a host-based 
threat detection system in a real environment for validation purposes. Although feature 
extraction from live traffic is beyond the scope of this research, CICFlowMeter was used to 
extract features from live traffic. CICFlowMeter saves the extracted feature to a csv file 
during live traffic feature extraction. To connect the CICFlowMeter process to the detection 
engine, the detection engine uses a file watcher component, which triggers an event when the 
CICFlowMeter appends a new feature data to the csv file. When the new feature data arrives, 
it is passed to the running detection engine, as shown in the code of Listing 31. Then the 
detection engine determines the status of the traffic data and passes the result to the dashboard 
through the alert service.  Figure 14 and Figure 15 show both CICFlowMeter and the 
detection engine running at the same time.  
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public static void StartLiveTrafficFeatureExtraction() 
{ 
    string featuresFileIdentifier = DateTime.Now.ToString("yyy-MM-dd"); 
    string featuresFileName = $"{featuresFileIdentifier}_Flow.csv"; 
    FileSystemWatcher watcher = new FileSystemWatcher(); 
    watcher.Path = AppConfigSettings.LiveTrafficFeaturePath; 
    watcher.Filter = featuresFileName; 
    watcher.NotifyFilter = (NotifyFilters.LastWrite); 
    watcher.Changed += new FileSystemEventHandler(OnNewFeatureDataAdded); 
    watcher.Created += new FileSystemEventHandler(OnNewFeatureDataAdded); 
 
    var featuresFileStream = new FileStream( 
                   AppConfigSettings.LiveTrafficFeaturePath + featuresFileName, 
                   FileMode.Open, FileAccess.Read, FileShare.ReadWrite); 
    featuresFileReader = new StreamReader(featuresFileStream); 
 
    watcher.EnableRaisingEvents = true; 
} 
 
private static void OnNewFeatureDataAdded(object sender, FileSystemEventArgs e) 
{ 
    var lines = featuresFileReader.ReadToEnd(); 
    IEnumerable<string> featureLines = lines.Split('\n').TakeLast(10); 
    foreach (string line in featureLines) 
    { 
        if (!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(line)) 
        { 
            if (!line.StartsWith("Flow") && !line.Contains("Infinity")  
                 && !line.Contains("NaN")) 
            { 
                var features = line.Split(',').SkipLast(1).ToList(); 
                features.RemoveAt(6); 
                features.RemoveAt(0); 
                string featureString = string.Join(",", features); 
                var featureData = DataConverter.ConvertToFeatureDataObject( 
                                                               featureString); 
 
                DetectionEngine.DetectWithCt(featureData); 
            } 
        } 
    } 
} 
Listing 31. Live traffic feature file watcher implementation. 
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Figure 14. CICFlowMeter extracting features from live traffic. 
 
Figure 15. Detection engine processing live traffic features.6 
 Table 18 shows the performance of the detection engine running as a host-based threat 
detection system using the search engine and the ML.NET engine. As the result shows, 
neither engine consumes much resources. 
 
6 The detection engine processed 60 different features for each traffic data, but the dashboard grid shows only 
selected features. 
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Table 18. Performance of the Detection Engine Running as a Host-Based Detection System 
Search Engine ML.NET 
  
5.5 Summary 
In this chapter we have discussed several evaluation, validation, and optimization 
techniques. Evaluation metrics include accuracy, precision, and recall rates of the detection 
engine. The initial evaluation result was optimized by applying different techniques such as 
choosing important features and optimizing scoring algorithms. The search engine-based 
detection engine yielded a detection accuracy closer to the ML.NET engine; however, the 
ML.NET engine is faster and consumes fewer CPU resources than the search engine, 
especially in high-volume traffic detection. Unlike the ML.NET binary model, the search 
engine can be continuously trained without destroying the original model. Both engines have 
passed through load testing and stability testing by simulating high-volume traffic. The newly 
developed cyber threat detection framework has the capabilities of both engines. 
This concludes Chapter 5. Case Study. This chapter discussed setting up evaluation 
metrics, evaluation of algorithms and components, optimizing techniques, and validating and 
deploying the new framework. Empirical analysis and performance results of the framework 
were discussed in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter concludes with the overall outcome of the research, a list of 
contributions, limitations of the research, and recommendations for future research. 
This research shows the possibility of a search engine serving as a cyber threat 
detection framework. It also shows that the search engine-based threat detection engine can be 
reinforced by a machine learning-based engine. As a result, using the search- and machine 
learning-based engines working together improves the capability of the cyber threat detection 
system.  
Using two different technologies, search engines and machine learning, the newly 
developed framework was focused on the analysis of network traffic for cyber threat 
detection. Several artifacts such as traffic feature processors, detection engines, an alert 
service, and dashboard applications have been developed. A search engine library, Lucene 
was customized to function as a threat detection tool. During customization, several 
algorithms and techniques have also been investigated. The developed framework was tested 
and validated. In this chapter we will explore the outcomes of the research, its contributions 
and limitations, and recommendations for future research. 
6.1 Contributions 
1. A VSM-based search engine can function as a cyber threat detection engine. 
The primary purpose of search engines is text mining and document ranking. However, this 
research showed that search engines can also function as cyber threat detection systems. The 
opensource search engine library Lucene was used to validate the theory that search engines 
could function as cyber threat detection frameworks. To achieve this, customization of 
Lucene components such as the analyzer, tokenizer, indexer chain, scoring algorithms, and 
searcher was necessary. The detection accuracy of the customized search engine was initially 
closer (2% accuracy difference) to that of the Microsoft machine learning framework 
96 
 
ML.NET used by cyber security tools such as Microsoft Defender. The search engine can 
improve its detection accuracy through self-learning. 
 
2. This cyber threat detection framework uses Artificial Intelligence and classical 
technologies. Using mixed technologies in intrusion detection systems improves detection 
performance (Samrin & Vasumathi, 2017). Search engine and machine learning technologies 
were used in the development of the cyber threat detection framework. The developed threat 
detection framework incorporated two detection engines: the search engine-based and the 
ML.NET-based machine learning engine. The two detection engines each have their own 
benefits and drawbacks, but the proposed framework is able to take the best of each engine. 
For instance, the machine learning binary classification model has a faster detection speed and 
better detection accuracy than the search engine; however, it cannot predict the details of the 
attack. Another drawback of the machine learning model is the inability to train the model 
while it is running without destroying the previous model because the FastTree algorithm, 
which the binary classification is built on, is not a retrainable algorithm. The search engine 
based cyber threat detection model can predict details of the attack and update itself to 
improve its accuracy without destroying its model. 
 
3. This cyber threat detection framework is self-learning. Although the search 
engine model has slower detection speed and slightly lower detection accuracy at the 
beginning, it can predict the details of the attacks and can be retrained while it is running 
without destroying the model in use. The developed framework can run both the search 
engine and the machine learning models at the same time. When the two models run together, 
the machine learning model serves as a continuous trainer to the search engine model—with 
this, the search engine learns new incidents and improves its accuracy as it continues running. 
Eventually, the continuous training makes the search engine grow smarter as it is trained by 
the machine learning engine. 
 
4. Manhattan distance similarity has better performance than Euclidean distance 
and Cosine similarity in the Lucene search engine library for KNN-based classification. 
One of the search engine customization tasks was to implement classification and similarity 
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algorithms. The KNN algorithm was used in the search engine model to classify nearby traffic 
instances. By default, Lucene search engine uses Cosine similarity. In this research, Cosine 
similarity has been proven to be less accurate in measuring similarity between two traffic 
instances represented by vectors in the search engine model. Usually Euclidean distance 
similarity is used with KNN algorithm for classification.  In this research the square of the 
Euclidean distance similarity has the same classification accuracy as the Euclidean distance 
similarity. While the equivalency of the similarity algorithms was being proven, it was also 
discovered that the Manhattan distance similarity has the same classification accuracy as the 
Euclidean distance and the square of Euclidean distance similarities, but the Manhattan 
distance similarity has a slightly better performance in the Lucene search engine similarity 
scoring.  
 
5. Variable-dimension VSM has achieved better accuracy than n-dimensional 
VSM in the Lucene-based cyber threat classification model. The search engine-based 
threat detection model uses VSM. The dimension of the vector space is the same as the 
number of features extracted from the traffic instance. The VSM model in search engines has 
variable dimensions because the indexed documents do not have the same number of 
terms/words all the time. The feature extractor generates a fixed number of features from the 
traffic instance. Indexing each feature set makes the VSM model have a fixed dimensional 
model. For example, if the feature generator generates n features, the respective model will be 
n-dimensional VSM. Indexing non-zero value feature sets gives the VSM a variable 
dimension. This research showed that variable-dimensional VSM model yielded better 
accuracy and performance than n-dimensional VSM because it runs fewer similarity score 
computations.  
 
6. Every network traffic feature is not equally important for determining the 
status of the traffic. A feature extractor component can generate several features from the 
traffic instance to inspect the traffic behavior. However, not all the features are equally 
important for classification; some features have higher value in determining the status of the 
traffic. The Permutation Feature Importance (PFI) technique was used to filter out less-
important features. Feature reduction reduces noise and the training time of the model. 
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Particularly for the search engine-based model, feature reduction improves the detection time 
because it reduces the number of computations in the VSM.  
 
7. The use of different cutting-edge technologies in the cyber threat detection 
development leads to better results. The developed framework used the latest technologies 
in the artifact development. For example, ML.NET is the most recent machine learning 
framework used by Microsoft and was recently released as opensource. The alert service uses 
the popular logger component log4net used in several enterprise software (Apache Software 
Foundation, 2017) and in development for many years; the dashboard application engages in 
real-time communication using WebSocket protocol to display alerts as soon as a threat is 
detected. The entire framework was developed using the latest Microsoft .NET Core 
framework, which targets multiple platforms and operating systems. This makes the 
developed framework run on different operating systems such as Windows, macOS, and 
Linux. 
6.2 Limitations and Future Research 
This research was intended to develop a threat detection framework, not a complete 
cyber threat detection appliance. In order for the framework to grow into a complete cyber 
threat detection application, at least the following features need to be researched and 
incorporated:  
1. Native feature extraction component: Feature extraction is an important step in 
developing threat detection systems. Because developing feature extraction was not within the 
scope of this research, a third-party feature extractor tool was used to extract features from 
live traffic to validate the framework. To advance the developed framework to a complete 
cyber threat detection application, a feature extractor component needs to be developed 
natively as part of the framework.  
2. Host-based anomaly detection engine: This research focused on network traffic 
analysis. In addition to network-based detection, it is important to analyze the impact of the 
traffic on the destination host for end-to-end threat intelligence. Therefore, a host-based 
anomaly detection component needs to be developed and integrated as part of the framework 
to build an end-to-end threat intelligence system.  
99 
 
3. Heuristic-based analysis: The threat detection engines in the framework are based 
on machine learning, which sometimes produce false positives or false negatives. A separate 
analysis framework needs to be implemented to automatically discard false positives and false 
negatives by further analyzing the traffic activity, such as the reputation of the TCP 
connection properties, originating process behaviors, activities on the host device, etc. 
4. Robust reporting service: The developed framework incorporates an alert service 
component that can broadcast alerts in real-time communication to the connected clients such 
as dashboard applications. However, the dashboard application included in the framework has 
a limited reporting service. Adding a robust reporting service would increase the usability and 
functionality of the framework. 
6.3 Summary 
This research has introduced a new cyber threat detection approach by combining two 
complementary technologies: search engine and machine learning. The research also showed 
that search engines can function as threat detection systems with closer accuracy as a machine 
learning-based threat detection framework. The main advantages of combining search engine 
and machine learning for cyber threat detection are the following: a) the ability of the system 
to self-learn from its mistakes and grow smarter as it continues running; b) the capability of 
the system in predicting attack details since the search engine can store and analyze metadata 
of the training traffic data.  
Several components of the search engine such as analyzers, tokenizers, indexer, 
searcher, indexing, and scoring techniques have been customized to make the search engine 
function as a cyber threat detection engine. During the search engine customization process, 
this research also proved additional related findings, which are: a) Manhattan distance 
similarity has better performance than Euclidean distance and Cosine similarity in the Lucene 
search engine library for the KNN-based cyber threat classification model; b) variable-
dimension VSM has achieved better accuracy than n-dimensional VSM in the Lucene-based 
cyber threat classification model; c) every network traffic feature is not equally important to 
determine the status of the traffic. 
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With all these features, the new cyber threat detection framework improves existing 
cyber threat detection approaches and contributes to the mitigation of the ongoing cyber 
security problems we are facing.   
101 
 
REFERENCES 
Abadi, M., Barham, P., Chen, J., Chen, Z., Davis, A., Dean, J., Devin, M., Ghemawat, S., 
Irving, G., Isard, M., Kudlur, M., Levenberg, J., Monga, R., Moore, S., Murray, D. G., 
Steiner, B., Tucker, P., Vasudevan, V., Warden, P., … Zheng, X. (2016). TensorFlow: 
A system for large-scale machine learning. 12th USENIX Symposium on Operating 
Systems Design and Implementation (OSDI ’16), 21. 
Albin, E. (2011). A comparative analysis of the Snort and Suricata intrusion-detection 
systems. 
Al-Jarrah, O., & Arafat, A. (2015). Network Intrusion Detection System Using Neural 
Network Classification of Attack Behavior. Journal of Advances in Information 
Technology, 1–8. https://doi.org/10.12720/jait.6.1.1-8 
Ando, R. K., & Zhang, T. (2005). A Framework for Learning Predictive Structures from 
Multiple Tasks and Unlabeled Data. 37. 
Apache Software Foundation. (2017). Apache log4net Documentation. 
https://logging.apache.org/log4net/release/features.html 
Bello, F. L., Ravulakollu, K., & Amrita. (2015). Analysis and evaluation of hybrid intrusion 
detection system models. 2015 International Conference on Computers, 
Communications, and Systems (ICCCS), 93–97. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/CCOMS.2015.7562879 
Białecki, A., Muir, R., & Ingersoll, G. (2012). Apache Lucene 4. Proceedings of the SIGIR 
2012 Workshop on Open Source Information Retrieval, 17–23. 
Breiman, L. (2001). Random Forests. 
Bruneau, G. (2001). The History and Evolution of Intrusion Detection. 8. 
CAIDA. (2019). CAIDA Data—Overview of Datasets, Monitors, and Reports. 
http://www.caida.org/data/overview/ 
Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity. (2019). CICFlowMeter Documentation. 
https://github.com/ISCX/CICFlowMeter 
Chauhan, V., Jaiswal, A., & Khan, J. (2015). Web Page Ranking Using Machine Learning 
Approach. 2015 Fifth International Conference on Advanced Computing & 
Communication Technologies, 575–580. https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCT.2015.56 
102 
 
Chio, C., & Freeman, D. (2018). Machine Learning and Security. O’Reilly. 
Choudhury, S., & Bhowal, A. (2015). Comparative analysis of machine learning algorithms 
along with classifiers for network intrusion detection. 2015 International Conference 
on Smart Technologies and Management for Computing, Communication, Controls, 
Energy and Materials (ICSTM), 89–95. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICSTM.2015.7225395 
Cisco. (2019). Snort Documentation. https://www.snort.org/documents 
Creswell, J. W. (2014). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed method 
approaches (4th ed). Sage Publications. 
Day, D. J., & Burns, B. M. (2011). A Performance Analysis of Snort and Suricata Network 
Intrusion Detection and Prevention Engines. 6. 
García-Teodoro, P., Díaz-Verdejo, J., Maciá-Fernández, G., & Vázquez, E. (2009). Anomaly-
based network intrusion detection: Techniques, systems and challenges. Computers & 
Security, 28(1–2), 18–28. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2008.08.003 
Garg, T., & Khurana, S. S. (2014). Comparison of classification techniques for intrusion 
detection dataset using WEKA. International Conference on Recent Advances and 
Innovations in Engineering (ICRAIE-2014), 1–5. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/ICRAIE.2014.6909184 
Gómez, J., Gil, C., Padilla, N., Baños, R., & Jiménez, C. (2009). Design of a Snort-Based 
Hybrid Intrusion Detection System. In S. Omatu, M. P. Rocha, J. Bravo, F. Fernández, 
E. Corchado, A. Bustillo, & J. M. Corchado (Eds.), Distributed Computing, Artificial 
Intelligence, Bioinformatics, Soft Computing, and Ambient Assisted Living (Vol. 5518, 
pp. 515–522). Springer Berlin Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02481-
8_75 
Gracia, L. (2008). Programming with Libpcap Sniffing the Network From Our Own 
Application. Hard Core IT Security Magazine, 3(2). 
Habibi Lashkari, A., Draper Gil, G., Mamun, M. S. I., & Ghorbani, A. A. (2017). 
Characterization of Tor Traffic using Time based Features: Proceedings of the 3rd 
International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy, 253–262. 
https://doi.org/10.5220/0006105602530262 
103 
 
Hall, M., Frank, E., Holmes, G., Pfahringer, B., Reutemann, P., & Witten, I. H. (2009). The 
WEKA data mining software: An update. ACM SIGKDD Explorations Newsletter, 
11(1), 10. https://doi.org/10.1145/1656274.1656278 
Hevner, A. R., March, S. T., Park, J., & Ram, S. (2004). Design Science in Information 
Systems Research. MIS Quarterly, 28(1), 75–105. 
Hu, Q., Asghar, M. R., & Brownlee, N. (2017). Evaluating network intrusion detection 
systems for high-speed networks. 2017 27th International Telecommunication 
Networks and Applications Conference (ITNAC), 1–6. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/ATNAC.2017.8215374 
Hung, C.-Y., Chen, W.-C., Lai, P.-T., Lin, C.-H., & Lee, C.-C. (2017). Comparing deep 
neural network and other machine learning algorithms for stroke prediction in a large-
scale population-based electronic medical claims database. 2017 39th Annual 
International Conference of the IEEE Engineering in Medicine and Biology Society 
(EMBC), 3110–3113. https://doi.org/10.1109/EMBC.2017.8037515 
IETF. (2011). The WebSocket Protocol. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6455 
Kemmerer, R. A., & Vigna, G. (2002). Intrusion detection: A brief history and overview. 
Computer, 35(4), supl27–supl30. https://doi.org/10.1109/MC.2002.1012428 
Kissel, R. (2013). Glossary of key information security terms (NIST IR 7298r2). National 
Institute of Standards and Technology. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.7298r2 
Kong, L., Huang, G., Wu, K., Tang, Q., & Ye, S. (2018). Comparison of Internet Traffic 
Identification on Machine Learning Methods. 2018 International Conference on Big 
Data and Artificial Intelligence (BDAI), 38–41. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/BDAI.2018.8546682 
Koomen, T., & Pol, M. (1999). Test Process Improvement—A Practical Step-by-Step Guide 
to Structured Testing. Addison Wesley. 
Li, W., & Zeng, S. (2016). A Vector Space Model based spam SMS filter. 2016 11th 
International Conference on Computer Science & Education (ICCSE), 553–557. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCSE.2016.7581640 
Lin, W.-H., Lin, H.-C., Wang, P., Wu, B.-H., & Tsai, J.-Y. (2018). Using convolutional 
neural networks to network intrusion detection for cyber threats. 2018 IEEE 
104 
 
International Conference on Applied System Invention (ICASI), 1107–1110. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/ICASI.2018.8394474 
Mehmood, T., & Rais, H. B. M. (2016). Machine learning algorithms in context of intrusion 
detection. 2016 3rd International Conference on Computer and Information Sciences 
(ICCOINS), 369–373. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCOINS.2016.7783243 
Microsoft. (2014). Introduction to SignalR. https://docs.microsoft.com/en-
us/aspnet/signalr/overview/getting-started/introduction-to-signalr 
Microsoft. (2016). Microsoft Message Analyzer Operating Guide. 
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/message-analyzer/microsoft-message-analyzer-
operating-guide 
Microsoft. (2017). Task-based asynchronous programming. https://docs.microsoft.com/en-
us/dotnet/standard/parallel-programming/task-based-asynchronous-programming 
Microsoft. (2018). Introduction to ASP.NET Core SignalR. https://docs.microsoft.com/en-
us/aspnet/core/signalr/introduction?view=aspnetcore-2.1 
Microsoft. (2019a). ML.NET- An open source and cross-platform machine learning 
framework. https://dotnet.microsoft.com/apps/machinelearning-ai/ml-dotnet 
Microsoft. (2019b). The Microsoft Cognitive Toolkit. https://www.microsoft.com/en-
us/cognitive-toolkit/ 
Microsoft. (2019c). Visual Studio. https://visualstudio.microsoft.com/ 
Microsoft. (2019d). Custom AI Models with Azure Machine Learning Studio and ML.NET. 
https://devblogs.microsoft.com/premier-developer/custom-ai-models-with-azure-
machine-learning-studio-and-ml-net/ 
Microsoft. (2019e). Model evaluation metrics in ML.NET. https://docs.microsoft.com/en-
us/dotnet/machine-learning/resources/metrics 
Microsoft. (2019f). Explain model predictions using Permutation Feature Importance. 
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/machine-learning/how-to-guides/explain-
machine-learning-model-permutation-feature-importance-ml-net 
Microsoft. (2019g). ML.NET - Re-train a model. https://docs.microsoft.com/en-
us/dotnet/machine-learning/how-to-guides/retrain-model-ml-net 
105 
 
Microsoft. (2020). Microsoft Defender Uses ML.NET to Stop Malware. 
https://dotnet.microsoft.com/apps/machinelearning-ai/ml-dotnet/customers/microsoft-
defender 
Mitra, B., Diaz, F., & Craswell, N. (2017). Luandri: A Clean Lua Interface to the Indri Search 
Engine. ArXiv:1702.05042 [Cs]. http://arxiv.org/abs/1702.05042 
Modi, C., Patel, D., Borisaniya, B., Patel, H., Patel, A., & Rajarajan, M. (2013). A survey of 
intrusion detection techniques in Cloud. Journal of Network and Computer 
Applications, 36(1), 42–57. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jnca.2012.05.003 
Mowla, N., Doh, I., & Chae, K. (2017). Evolving neural network intrusion detection system 
for MCPS. 2017 19th International Conference on Advanced Communication 
Technology (ICACT), 183–187. https://doi.org/10.23919/ICACT.2017.7890080 
Narudin, F. A., Feizollah, A., Anuar, N. B., & Gani, A. (2016). Evaluation of machine 
learning classifiers for mobile malware detection. Soft Computing, 20(1), 343–357. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00500-014-1511-6 
Netresec. (2019). NetworkMiner Documentation. 
https://www.netresec.com/?page=NetworkMiner 
Olan, M. (2003). Unit testing: Test early, Test Often. ResearchGate. 
OpenNMS. (2019). OpenNMS Documentation. https://www.opennms.com/documentation/ 
Pathak, B., & Lal, N. (2017). Information retrieval from heterogeneous data sets using 
moderated IDF-cosine similarity in vector space model. 2017 International 
Conference on Energy, Communication, Data Analytics and Soft Computing 
(ICECDS), 3793–3799. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICECDS.2017.8390174 
Pries-Heje, J., Baskerville, R., & Venable, J. R. (2008). Strategies for Design Science 
Research Evaluation. 13. 
Qi, X., Wang, T., & Liu, J. (2017). Comparison of Support Vector Machine and Softmax 
Classifiers in Computer Vision. 2017 Second International Conference on 
Mechanical, Control and Computer Engineering (ICMCCE), 151–155. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/ICMCCE.2017.49 
Salton, G., Wong, A., & Yang, C. S. (1975). A vector space model for automatic indexing. 
Communications of the ACM, 18(11), 613–620. 
https://doi.org/10.1145/361219.361220 
106 
 
Samrin, R., & Vasumathi, D. (2017). Review on anomaly based network intrusion detection 
system. 2017 International Conference on Electrical, Electronics, Communication, 
Computer, and Optimization Techniques (ICEECCOT), 141–147. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/ICEECCOT.2017.8284655 
Santos, P. S. M. dos, & Travassos, G. H. (2009). Action Research Use in Software 
Engineering: An Initial Survey. 414–417. 
Sewak, M., Sahay, S. K., & Rathore, H. (2018). Comparison of Deep Learning and the 
Classical Machine Learning Algorithm for the Malware Detection. 2018 19th 
IEEE/ACIS International Conference on Software Engineering, Artificial Intelligence, 
Networking and Parallel/Distributed Computing (SNPD), 293–296. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/SNPD.2018.8441123 
Sharafaldin, I., Habibi Lashkari, A., & Ghorbani, A. A. (2018). Toward Generating a New 
Intrusion Detection Dataset and Intrusion Traffic Characterization: Proceedings of the 
4th International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy, 108–116. 
https://doi.org/10.5220/0006639801080116 
Singh, K., & Agrawal, S. (2011). Comparative analysis of five machine learning algorithms 
for IP traffic classification. 2011 International Conference on Emerging Trends in 
Networks and Computer Communications (ETNCC), 33–38. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/ETNCC.2011.5958481 
Statista. (2019). Annual Detections of New Malware Worldwide from 2015 to May 2019. 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/680953/global-malware-volume/ 
Suricata. (2019). Suricata Documentation. https://suricata-ids.org/docs/ 
Tcpdump. (2019). TCPDump & Libpcap Documentations. https://www.tcpdump.org/ 
Telerik. (2019). Telerik Fiddler Documentation. https://docs.telerik.com/fiddler 
The Apache Software Foundation. (2019). The Apache Lucene. http://lucene.apache.org/ 
The Zeek Project Revision. (2019). Zeek Documentation. 
https://docs.zeek.org/en/stable/intro/index.html 
Thongkanchorn, K., Ngamsuriyaroj, S., & Visoottiviseth, V. (2013). Evaluation studies of 
three intrusion detection systems under various attacks and rule sets. 2013 IEEE 
International Conference of IEEE Region 10 (TENCON 2013), 1–4. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/TENCON.2013.6718975 
107 
 
Turney, P. D., & Pantel, P. (2010). From Frequency to Meaning: Vector Space Models of 
Semantics. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 37, 141–188. 
https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.2934 
Turtle, H., Hegde, Y., & Rowe, S. A. (2012). Yet another comparison of Lucene and Indri 
performance. Proceedings of the SIGIR 2012 Workshop on Open Source Information 
Retrieval, 4. 
Unicode. (2019). Unicode 12.1 Character Code Charts. 
http://www.unicode.org/versions/Unicode12.1.0/ 
University of Glasgow. (2019). Terrier Documentation. http://terrier.org/ 
Van Gysel, C., Kanoulas, E., & de Rijke, M. (2017). Pyndri: A Python Interface to the Indri 
Search Engine. ArXiv:1701.00749 [Cs]. http://arxiv.org/abs/1701.00749 
Wieringa, R. (2014). Design Science Methodology for Information Systems and Software 
Engineering. Springer. 
Wieringa, R., Daneva, M., & Condori-Fernandez, N. (2011). The Structure of Design 
Theories, and an Analysis of their Use in Software Engineering Experiments. 2011 
International Symposium on Empirical Software Engineering and Measurement, 295–
304. https://doi.org/10.1109/ESEM.2011.38 
Wireshark. (2019). Wireshark Documentations. https://www.wireshark.org/docs/ 
Yin, D., Nobata, C., Langlois, J.-M., Chang, Y., Hu, Y., Tang, J., Daly, T., Zhou, M., 
Ouyang, H., Chen, J., Kang, C., & Deng, H. (2016). Ranking Relevance in Yahoo 
Search. Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGKDD International Conference on 
Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining - KDD ’16, 323–332. 
https://doi.org/10.1145/2939672.2939677 
  
108 
 
APPENDIX A: CLASS DIAGRAMS 
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APPENDIX B: LIST OF FEATURES 
This table shows a list of features with Permutation Feature Importance (PFI) metrics 
in descending order of their importance. 
Feature Wght Δ-AUC Δ-Accuracy Δ-F1Score Δ-Precision Δ-TPR Δ-FPR 
Init Win bytes 
forward 
1 0.04999 0.07875 0.09242 0.03301 0.1343 0.02321 
Init Win bytes 
backward 
0.88 0.03566 0.06658 0.07038 0.07063 0.06984 0.06333 
Destination Port 0.57 0.03256 0.0526 0.058 0.03891 0.0726 0.0326 
Min seg size 
forward 
0.39 0.01505 0.006006 0.007327 0.005831 0.0178 0.005784 
RST Flag Count 0.29 0.01023 0.01293 0.01537 0.005775 0.0319 0.006041 
Bwd Packet 
Length Std 
0.34 0.007186 0.01722 0.01448 0.05425 0.0209 0.05534 
Total Length of 
Bwd Packets 
0.69 0.006158 0.01003 0.01176 0.003128 0.02354 0.003482 
Fwd Header 
Length 
0.48 0.005696 0.01152 0.01241 0.009226 0.01494 0.008107 
Bwd Header 
Length 
0.11 0.004672 0.007109 0.008432 0.003787 0.01816 0.003946 
Fwd Packet 
Length Max 
0.1 0.003927 0.005658 0.005235 0.01465 0.00265 0.01396 
Fwd IAT Min 0.25 0.003677 0.007736 0.008168 0.007976 0.008288 0.007185 
ECE Flag 
Count 
0.06 0.002934 0.007737 0.009223 0.004564 0.02017 0.004695 
Flow IAT Min 0.3 0.002397 0.004355 0.005122 0.002041 0.01088 0.002176 
Fwd Packet 
Length Mean 
0.09 0.002 0.00332 0.002338 0.0178 0.01074 0.01739 
Bwd Packet 
Length Max 
0.15 0.001483 0.00147 0.001601 0.0008714 0.002191 0.0007488 
Bwd Packets/s 0.25 0.001301 0.002939 0.002837 0.00635 7.50E-05 0.005953 
Bwd IAT Max 0.09 0.001216 0.003019 0.003676 0.003097 0.009138 0.003099 
Min Packet 
Length 
0.1 0.001211 0.002028 0.002568 0.003413 0.007402 0.003346 
Total Length of 
Fwd Packets 
0.11 0.001159 0.003792 0.004531 0.002716 0.01037 0.00278 
Packet Length 
Mean 
0.13 0.001117 0.001468 0.001614 0.0006655 0.002384 0.0005517 
Average Packet 
Size 
0.09 0.001038 0.002037 0.002595 0.003631 0.007625 0.003551 
Fwd Packet 
Length Min 
0.16 0.001001 0.00315 0.003832 0.00318 0.009483 0.003183 
Flow IAT Max 0.11 0.0009405 0.002664 0.003015 0.0001611 0.005327 5.17E-07 
Bwd Packet 
Length Mean 
0.19 0.0009155 0.001395 0.00165 0.0008625 0.003692 0.0009018 
Bwd IAT Min 0.08 0.0008875 0.001396 0.001487 0.001254 0.001672 0.00112 
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Fwd IAT Max 0.1 0.0008791 0.001574 0.001775 0.0001418 0.003103 4.50E-05 
Packet Length 
Std 
0.11 0.0008547 0.001794 0.002026 0.0001415 0.003556 3.21E-05 
Fwd Packets/s 0.12 0.0008529 0.001372 0.001699 0.001848 0.00458 0.001836 
Flow Bytes/s 0.19 0.0008471 0.002014 0.002456 0.002177 0.006209 0.002181 
Fwd Packet 
Length Std 
0.07 0.0008109 0.001569 0.001832 0.0006511 0.003849 0.0007105 
Fwd IAT Total 0.11 0.0006778 0.001282 0.001434 0.0002697 0.00238 0.0001841 
Flow Duration 0.09 0.0006725 0.0005556 0.0003552 0.003588 0.002315 0.003426 
Bwd Packet 
Length Min 
0.13 0.000654 0.001259 0.001516 0.001144 0.00368 0.001162 
Flow IAT Std 0.08 0.0006259 0.000952 0.0009441 0.001766 0.0002648 0.001639 
Bwd IAT Std 0.07 0.0006047 0.0005874 0.0006614 6.17E-05 0.00115 2.53E-05 
Bwd IAT Mean 0.05 0.0004883 0.0002079 4.33E-05 0.003658 0.003101 0.003517 
Fwd IAT Std 0.09 0.0004167 0.001047 0.0009723 0.002794 0.0005316 0.002625 
Fwd PSH Flags 0.1 0.0003863 0.0004812 0.0004331 0.001472 0.0004225 0.001385 
PSH Flag Count 0.06 0.0003835 2.43E-05 0.0002883 0.003432 0.003361 0.003312 
Flow IAT Mean 0.06 0.0003634 0.0007583 0.0009749 0.001505 0.002994 0.001477 
Idle Std 0.07 0.0003266 0.0008638 0.0008698 0.001433 0.0004039 0.001324 
Max Packet 
Length 
0.09 0.0003095 0.0004628 0.0003398 0.00242 0.001375 0.002301 
Fwd IAT Mean 0.07 0.0002825 0.0006422 0.0005944 0.00175 0.0003578 0.001642 
Bwd IAT Total 0.07 0.000251 0.000379 0.0004215 0.0001076 0.0006769 8.12E-05 
Active Std 0.07 0.0002138 0.0004005 0.0003939 0.0007891 6.77E-05 0.0007332 
Idle Mean 0.04 0.0002068 0.001414 0.001769 0.002135 0.004937 0.00211 
Total Backward 
Packets 
0.05 0.0001904 0.0003131 0.000219 0.001784 0.00107 0.001696 
Flow Packets/s 0.05 0.0001876 0.0002143 0.0002295 0.0001765 0.000272 0.0001567 
Total Fwd 
Packets 
0.13 0.0001851 0.0003478 0.000413 0.0002473 0.000952 0.0002565 
Act data pkt 
fwd 
0.13 0.0001441 0.0003284 0.0003296 0.0005605 0.0001386 0.0005181 
Active Min 0.08 0.0001357 0.0003397 0.0004051 0.0002624 0.0009499 0.0002704 
Active Max 0.03 8.60E-05 0.0003188 0.0002923 0.0009074 0.0002141 0.0008517 
Idle Max 0.06 8.21E-05 0.001972 0.002467 0.002933 0.006836 0.002892 
ACK Flag 
Count 
0.05 5.86E-05 7.65E-05 6.11E-05 0.0003381 0.0001665 0.0003196 
Down/Up Ratio 0.11 3.67E-05 0.0001753 0.0002022 4.62E-05 0.0004049 5.43E-05 
URG Flag 
Count 
0.03 3.22E-05 9.18E-05 6.51E-05 0.0005132 0.000303 0.0004866 
Idle Min 0.06 2.50E-05 0.0001407 0.0002137 0.000717 0.0009747 0.0006934 
FIN Flag Count 0.01 1.34E-05 1.81E-06 2.45E-06 5.29E-06 8.79E-06 5.17E-06 
Active Mean 0.04 3.31E-06 0.0003074 0.0004256 0.001015 0.001602 0.0009871 
Fwd URG Flags 0.04 1.75E-06 2.59E-07 7.41E-07 5.92E-06 6.21E-06 5.69E-06 
Protocol 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bwd PSH Flags 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Bwd URG 
Flags 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Packet Length 
Variance 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SYN Flag 
Count 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CWE Flag 
Count 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Avg Fwd 
Segment Size 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Avg Bwd 
Segment Size 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Fwd Avg 
Bytes/Bulk 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Fwd Avg 
Packets/Bulk 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Fwd Avg Bulk 
Rate 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bwd Avg 
Bytes/Bulk 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bwd Avg 
Packets/Bulk 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bwd Avg Bulk 
Rate 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Subflow Fwd 
Packets 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Subflow Fwd 
Bytes 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Subflow Bwd 
Packets 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Subflow Bwd 
Bytes 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
  
